University of Miami Law Review
Volume 75
Number 1 Fall 2020

Article 3

12-8-2020

Equitable Defenses in Patent Law
Christa J. Laser

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christa J. Laser, Equitable Defenses in Patent Law, 75 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (2020)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol75/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

ARTICLES
Equitable Defenses in Patent Law
CHRISTA J. LASER*
In patent law, “unenforceability” can have immense consequences. At least five equitable doctrines make up the defense of
“unenforceability” as it was codified into the Patent Act in 1952:
laches; estoppel; unclean hands; patent misuse; and according to
some, inequitable conduct. Yet in the seventy years since incorporation of equitable defenses into the patent statute, the Supreme Court
has not clarified their reach. Indeed, twice in the last four years, the
Supreme Court avoided giving complete guidance on the crucial
questions of whether, and when, such equitable defenses are available to bar damages in cases brought at law.
Several interpretive methods have been proposed for determining the reach of generally worded statutes like the Patent Act. Under
a dynamic statutory interpretation, courts would be permitted to develop such statutes in accordance with what the law ought to be.
Under a traditional faithful agent approach, in contrast, courts
would try to determine the scope as set forth by the legislature, piecing together context and history to frame limited words. The scope
of equitable defenses in patent law is an ideal proving ground between these methods, having both historical background for use in
traditional approaches and high-stakes social questions that factor
into a dynamic approach—what conduct do we allow patentees to
engage in before we cut off remedies for infringement on innovations that support our health and modern lifestyle?
*
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Setting the stage of the statutory interpretive battle, this Article
examines the historical and statutory bases of equitable limits on
patent law, with a particular focus on the substantive equitable defenses of unclean hands and patent misuse. It contrasts the history
of equitable defenses such as estoppel, which crossed fully into
courts of law well before the merger of law and equity and the Patent Act, with equitable defenses such as laches, unclean hands, and
misuse. This Article walks through these defenses’ pre-codification
roots and potential statutory interpretations and presents normative
and constitutional considerations under the competing interpretive
approaches. It also presents a surprising approach to inequitable
conduct, arguing that it is not an equitable defense and should no
longer result in infectious invalidity. This Article is the first to provide a comprehensive framework for the analysis of equitable defenses in patent law.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2016, a jury awarded pharmaceutical company Merck
$200 million in compensatory damages after finding that its competitor, Gilead, infringed two of Merck’s patents directed to treatments for Hepatitis C,1 which the jury determined to be valid.2 Three
months later, the trial judge determined that Merck’s unclean hands
barred all remedies based on litigation and business misconduct, including allegedly using illicitly obtained confidential information,
which rendered the damages verdict moot.3 The Federal Circuit affirmed.4 In 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Merck &
Co. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.,5 leaving many open questions on the
reach of equitable defenses, not the least of which are these: When
1
See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1233–34 (Fed. Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).
2
Jury Verdict, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 13-cv-04057 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 24, 2016), ECF. No. 392.
3
See id.; see Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 13-cv-04057-BLF, 2016
WL 3143943, at *3, 39 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016).
4
Gilead Scis., 888 F.3d at 1233–34.
5
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 139
S. Ct. 797 (2019) (No. 18-378).
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should equitable doctrines bar damages, a remedy at law?6 Under
what circumstances can courts expand the reach of statutorily incorporated equitable principles beyond pre-codification roots?
The competing interpretive approaches that would answer these
questions are in battle, with scholars and courts divided on their merits.7 This is particularly true when the competing interpretive approaches are applied to close questions of the meaning of generally
worded statutes,8 like the Patent Act of 1952. On one side of the
battle line, Professor William Eskridge has argued for a theory of
“dynamic statutory interpretation” under which courts determining
the meaning of ambiguous legal texts would give weight to what a
statute “ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present
day society[.]”9 Dynamic interpretation is a more moderate variation
of then-Professor Guido Calabresi’s suggestion that, in an “age of
statutes,” courts should develop statutory law as courts have developed the common law, with renovations to meet new needs.10
Eskridge urges that, particularly when statutes are broadly worded
or involve areas of law where there is rapid technological and legal
change, courts should “develop that statute in accordance with contemporary, rather than purely historical, policy.”11
On the other side of the interpretive battle line is the prevailing
view in American law that courts applying statutes should act as the
faithful agents of the lawmaking body, relegating their own
6
See id.; see Gilead Scis., 888 F.3d at 1233, 1247–48; Gilead Scis., 2016
WL 3143943, at 39.
7
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 23–24; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479–
81 (1987) (disagreeing that statutes should be treated as static texts and arguing
that “statutes, like the Constitution and the common law, should be interpreted
dynamically . . . .”); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 2 (1982); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (describing competing methods of statutory interpretation and arguing in favor of a “faithful agent theory” where courts seek to
act as servants of the legislature); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989).
8
See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1516; see also Craig Allen Nard, Legal
Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 74–76 (2010).
9
Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1480–81 (quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors
Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
10
See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 2.
11
See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1517.
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judgment of what the law should be.12 The choice of which of these
two theories to use involves the inherent choice of the appropriate
respective authority of Congress and the courts under our Constitution.13 Those that advocate for application of a traditional faithful
agent viewpoint, therefore, argue that it better supports the constitutional separation of lawmaking power into the hands of the legislature and comports with the constitutional process of bicameralism
and presentment.14
In patent law, normative considerations supporting the use of
traditional interpretive methods include the proposition that certainty and stability of patent law are of critical importance to protecting investment in the development and commercialization of
technology and that codified law ideally provides more certainty
than judge-made doctrine that can be modified from case to case.15
On the other hand, patent law is also susceptible to the suggestion
that it should be interpreted dynamically.16 Indeed, scholars have argued that the patent code is a “common law enabling statute,”
whereby Congress left significant authority in the hands of the
courts to develop the law’s contours within only broad general
boundaries.17 Further supporting a dynamic approach, patents are
12

See Manning, supra note 7, at 5 (“[I]t is widely assumed that federal judges
must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 415 (1989)
(“According to the most prominent conception of the role of the courts in statutory
construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature . . . . The judicial task
is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1313 (1990) (“Traditional democratic theory suggests that the court interpreting
a statute must act as the faithful agent of the legislature’s intent.”).
13
See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 636–37 (1996)
[hereinafter Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference]; Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1995).
14
See Manning, supra note 7, at 57–58.
15
Infra Part III.B.
16
See Nard, supra note 8, at 53 (arguing that patent code leaves room for the
development of doctrines “emanating solely from Article III’s province”).
17
Id.; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 801 (2008) (stating by
analogy to Sherman Act that patent law “has always depended on common law
elaboration . . . .”).

6

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

directed to new technologies that often co-occur with rapid societal
change.18
Equity, in addition to patent law, is an area of law that is often
thought to be particularly flexible and open to arguments that judges
should be permitted to modify the scope of equity’s rules over time
according to changes in legal and societal norms.19 However, equity
is not limitless. Like patent law, it is framed by standards and boundaries in its application.20 For example, courts develop precedents
that cabin equitable doctrines over time,21 statutes may set out which
equitable doctrines are available under particular circumstances,22
or statutes may codify principles of equity as developed by the
courts.23 When a statute provides for equitable remedies or defenses,
the boundary of which equitable doctrines apply and how flexible
they remain depends upon how that statute incorporates those doctrines.24 Too little flexibility can erode the equitable nature of these
defenses.25 Yet too much flexibility can leave more than merely the
interpretation of law, but the making of law, in the hands of courts,
which may result in unintentional or uninformed policy choices if
the courts must rely on policy to determine the law.26
In patent law, equitable defenses developed first through decisional law, but in the mid-nineteenth century, Congress sought to
stabilize that law through incorporation of these defenses into the
patent statute.27 Specifically, the defense of “unenforceability” as it
18

See Nard, supra note 8, at 99.
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920
(1987).
20
See id. at 982.
21
See id. at 932.
22
Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 997, 1001 (2015).
23
Id. at 1012–14.
24
See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747,
777 (1982) (quoting Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co.,
550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977)) (“A judge’s discretion is not boundless and must be
exercised within the applicable rules of law or equity.”).
25
See Manning, supra note 7, at 105–06.
26
See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 424–25.
27
See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Law, 35 U.S.C.A. 1
(West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 170, 215–
16 (1993).
19
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was incorporated into the Patent Act of 1952 included at least the
equitable defenses of equitable estoppel, laches, unclean hands, and
patent misuse.28 Yet in the 70 years since incorporation of equitable
defenses into the patent statute, the Supreme Court has not illuminated the outer limits of equitable doctrines in patent law. It denied
certiorari in Merck & Co. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. on the issue of
unclean hands29 and sidestepped key questions in the context of
laches in its opinion in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First
Quality Baby Products, LLC.30 The Court likewise has not addressed pressing aspects of the doctrine of inequitable conduct following modifications to the statutory text that potentially affected
its scope.31 Significant gaps remain. Absent Supreme Court guidance, accurate application of the nuanced doctrines of equitable defenses in patent law requires courts to not only engage with the equities of a particular case but also to fully consider statutory history,
doctrinal history, and the appropriateness of competing interpretive
lenses to arrive at what the law of equitable defenses is.
Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to courts of
equity, the merger of actions in law and equity, and the role of decisional law at the boundaries of patent doctrines. It also provides brief
background on the dynamic and traditional interpretive lenses that
may be used to view the questions presented in this Article. Part II
provides an overview of the equitable defenses that were made a part
of patent law through statute. Focusing on the substantive equitable
defenses of unclean hands and misuse, this Part also applies possible
frameworks for determining the scope of equitable defenses in pat28

See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (1952) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 282); Federico, supra note 27, at 166 (“The patent act
of 1952 (this title) stems from two movements, one to amend the patent laws, and
the other to revise and codify the laws of the United States.”); Dawson Chem. Co.
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980) (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the
patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts
for the general judicial rules that had governed prior to that time.”); see also infra
Part II.A (discussing how inequitable conduct may not be an equitable defense
but instead a type of invalidity).
29
Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).
30
See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 966–67 (2017).
31
Infra Part II.E.
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ent law. The first framework includes the traditional approach
whereby courts examine whether the doctrine fits within a statutory
provision, such as the unenforceability defense available under section 282 of the Patent Act,32 determine whether terms in the statute
had an established meaning in decisional law, and then assess
whether expansion of the doctrine exceeds the scope of decisional
law as it was imputed into the statute. The second alternative framework includes the dynamic approach whereby courts view the statutory codification of equitable defenses as common law enabling,
and thereby, they look to decisional law, including law after enactment, the equities of each particular case, and societal and legal
norms in place at the time the case is decided.
Part III explores the constitutional considerations inherent in application of the competing interpretive methods and conducts a normative analysis of the role of courts versus the role of Congress in
determining the boundaries of equitable principles in patent law.
This Part discusses the authority of courts to make determinations
about the boundaries of equity after a codification event. It compares
the institutional advantages of courts versus Congress to set the
boundaries and policies of equitable defenses in patent law, given
these institutions’ structures, typical functioning, and ability to
gather information necessary to efficiently make policy choices.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INTERPRETIVE LENSES
A.

A Brief History of Equity

1. THE MERGER OF COURTS OF EQUITY AND LAW
From at least approximately the fourteenth century, the English
judicial system was divided into separate courts and procedures for
law and equity.33 The “common law” or “law” courts were characterized by use of a jury, a formalized pleading system, and

32

Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (1952) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 282).
33
See William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO.
L.J. 97, 105 (1929); Subrin, supra note 19, at 914 n.23 (1987) (noting that other
courts, in addition to courts of law and equity, were also available).
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development of precedent.34 Common law courts required plaintiffs
to cabin their legal dispute into pleading a cause of action from
among those commonly used in prior writs.35 Over time, precedent
developed indicating which facts were sufficient for specific causes
of action and procedure developed for resolving cases on the pleadings where there were no disputes of fact.36 The courts of law
awarded monetary compensation or actual damages as a remedy.37
The court of equity, by contrast, began as written requests to the
Chancellor to relieve parties from application of the common law in
exceptional cases.38 Indeed, the court of equity was not available to
parties who could obtain an adequate remedy at law.39 In its original
form, the outcome of a petition to the Chancellor depended primarily on the Chancellor’s conscience, such that outcomes often varied
in similar cases.40 In proceedings in the court of equity, the Chancellor could order the defendant to answer questions under oath (in
what was a precursor to modern discovery procedures) and would
weigh the case with considerations of fairness, the totality of the circumstances between the parties, and the impact on the parties and
the public.41 The court of equity had power to order specific relief
as the Chancellor decided was appropriate to stop future harm and

34

Subrin, supra note 19, at 914.
See id. at 915.
36
See id. For example, if the parties did not contest the facts but only contested legal issues, either side could demur, filing what is today a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, whereas if a party successfully traversed,
or showed that there were disputed factual issues that could permit recovery, the
case would proceed to a jury. Id. at 916.
37
See id. at 919.
38
Id. at 918; see Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486; 1 Ch.
Rep. 1, 7 (noting role of equity is “to soften and mollify the Extremity of the
Law . . . .”).
39
Subrin, supra note 19, at 920.
40
See PAUL S. DAVIES & GRAHAM VIRGO, EQUITY & TRUSTS: TEXT, CASES,
AND MATERIALS 4 (1st ed. 2013) (discussing history of equity jurisprudence, noting that in early years of equity “ultimately, the intervention of the Lord Chancellor depended upon the exercise of the Lord Chancellor’s own conscience. This
inherently discretionary approach meant that it was difficult to predict the outcome of any petition to the Lord Chancellor.”).
41
See Subrin, supra note 19, at 919.
35
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account for gains from the wrongdoing, such as the relief of an injunction or an accounting of profits.42
At the time of the founding of the United States, American federal courts were modeled after this split English system.43 The Constitution granted the federal courts the power to hear cases “in law
and equity.”44 The federal courts of law and equity were not physically separate, but plaintiffs were required to choose whether to present their cases in either the equity side of the court by a bill in equity
or in the law side of the court, which operated under separate procedures.45 Like in English law, the American court of law was characterized by use of a jury to decide factual issues and the potential for
recovery of monetary damages suffered by the aggrieved party.46
42

See id.
See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 48 (Jarius W. Perry ed., 12th ed.
1877); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 449 (2003) (“[E]arly American courts were modeling the
English method of complementary systems of law and equity.”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is true that the separation of the equity from the
legal jurisdiction is peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence; which is the
model that has been followed in several of the states.”).
44
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
45
See Main, supra note 43, at 450 (“Although Congress did not create a separate court of equity in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it contemplated that the federal
court system would administer law and equity on different ‘sides’ of the court and
by different procedures.”); Gustavus Ohlinger, Problems of Jurisdiction and
Venue and of the Right of Trial by Jury Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 240, 255 (1941) (“The temple of federal justice was originally constructed with a partition extending from the foundation to the roof. On
one side was a chamber labelled ‘law’ and on the other side a chamber marked
‘equity.’ There was no opening in the partition and not even the most astute lawyer
could penetrate it. If he found himself in the wrong chamber his case was dismissed, he was compelled to make his exit, and then from the outside enter the
proper chamber.”); see also Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States Courts, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283, 284 (1928) (noting that these
cases were presented in different sides of the same court, sometimes to same judge
playing a different role); Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 217, 231 (2018) (describing debates around the Judiciary Article’s inclusion of equity jurisdiction, noting that some objected to vesting equity power in
same federal courts that would hear cases at law).
46
See John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A
Study of Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1967) (noting
43
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Also, like in English courts, the court of equity could grant relief,
including injunctions to cease behavior or restitution to account for
wrongful gains.47 The court of equity was not available where an
adequate remedy could be obtained from the court of law.48 Federal
courts in their infancy adopted the equity precedent of the English
High Court of Chancery as their own.49
Nevertheless, after about 150 years of use in the United States,
the procedures for these separate systems were gradually merged together.50 In a key step toward merger in 1915, Congress passed the
Law and Equity Act, which permitted equitable defenses to be pled
in actions at law; this is contrary to the previous practice that required a separate bill in equity to be filed to try to enjoin the suit at
law from continuing.51 However, this statute did not provide that all
equitable defenses would become defenses that, if shown, would bar
causes of action at law—the Law and Equity Act merely effected a
procedural change, not a substantive one.52 Indeed, the Supreme
that “jury trial as of right was confined to actions at law”); see also Mark Lemley,
Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2013)
(indicating that in early common law monetary damages were only available in
courts sitting in law).
47
See Morley, supra note 45, at 228–29, 236–37 (noting that early American
courts sitting in equity applied English equity procedures).
48
Id. at 232 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 116, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789)
(“‘[S]uits in equity shall not be sustained in . . . courts of the United States, in any
case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.’”).
49
See Main, supra note 43, at 450.
50
See Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 956, ch. 90 § 274(b).
51
Id. (“That in all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by
answer, plea, or replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side
of the court.”); see Walter Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645,
650 (1922–1923). But see E.W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modern
Codes, 18 MICH. L. REV. 717, 720–21 (1920) (urging that equitable defenses
should be called legal defenses if they apply to bar actions at law after merger).
For historical clarity, and because historical clarity is necessary to properly apply
these defenses in patent law, this Article uses the term “equitable defense” if the
defense originated in a court of equity, even if the defense eventually equally
barred a remedy in law or equity.
52
See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat’l. Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922); see
also Clarksburg Tr. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins., 40 F.2d 626, 633 (4th Cir. 1930)
(“While this statute does not abolish the distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity, there can be no question that its purpose was to end the unseemly
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Court stated shortly after the Act was passed that “[w]hat was an
action at law before the Code is still an action founded on legal principles; and what was a bill in equity before the Code is still a civil
action founded on principles of equity.”53 Equitable defenses that
were not available to bar legal claims, such as injunctions to stop the
action at law from proceeding or cancellations of the right that
formed the basis for the legal cause of action, could not be interposed as equitable defenses to legal claims.54
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished separate
actions in law and equity and, instead, provided for “one form of
action to be known as ‘the civil action,’” where law and equity
would be pled together in a single, simplified form of pleading.55
practice of turning a litigant out of court because he had come in at the wrong
door.”); cf. Martin v. Smith, 65 A. 257, 259 (Me. 1906) (interpreting a similar
state statute adopted in Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ch. 84, § 17 (1903)) to determine
that reformation of a mortgage document based on mutual mistake could not be
interposed in an action at law).
53
Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at 242 (internal citations omitted); see also Charles
W. Joiner & Ray A. Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REV.
1059, 1077 (1957) (“The statute provides no new defenses, but rather provides a
new way of obtaining equitable relief by the device of a cross-action.”).
54
See Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at 242–43 (“If a defendant at law had an equitable
defense, he resorted to a bill in equity to enjoin the suit at law, until he could make
his equitable defense effective by a hearing before the chancellor. The hearing on
that bill was before the chancellor and not before a jury, and, if the prayer of the
bill was granted, the injunction against the suit at law was made perpetual and no
jury trial ensued. If the injunction was denied, the suit at law proceeded to verdict
and judgment.”); cf. Martin, 65 A. at 259.
55
See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory
committee’s note to 1938 amendment (“This rule follows in substance the usual
introductory statements to code practices which provide for a single action and
mode of procedure, with abolition of forms of action and procedural distinctions.”); Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L.
REV. 261, 262–63 (1939). States also gradually began to merge courts of law and
equity around the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, beginning with New
York in 1846. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 5, 8 (1846), reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 95, 124 (Robert C. Cumming et al.
eds., Albany, James B. Lyon 1894) (abolishing New York’s separate courts of
chancery and beginning transfer of cases arising in equity to courts with jurisdiction in both law and equity). The New York Field Code of 1848 then merged legal
and equitable forms of pleading into a simplified, combined form of pleading both
legal and equitable claims for relief. See THE CODE OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE
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However, these rules, like the 1915 Act, only altered procedure and
did not substantively join law and equity.56 Equitable defenses that
would have been insufficient to enjoin a suit at law if filed as a separate bill in equity remained unavailable to bar legal claims in the
combined systems after both the Law and Equity Act of 1915 and
the federal merger of legal and equitable pleading in 1938.57 It is
true that in some areas of law, like contracts, equitable defenses frequently came to be used to bar legal claims after the merger.58 However, this is not because the merger made equitable defenses newly
and completely available to legal claims; it is because, in contract
law, requests for equitable relief that would have the effect of nullifying the claim at law were frequently available by a plea in equity
to bar enforcement at law prior to the merger.59 For example, an action to reform a contract due to mutual mistake in its execution was
an action available in equity, and its effect could be used to undermine the basis for asserting breach of the contract at law.60 A number
OF NEW YORK

65 (New York, John S. Voorhies 2d ed. 1852); Mildred V. Coe &
Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 239–40 (1942); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley
Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision,
6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 316 (1988). Most other states soon followed. See Samuel L. Bray, supra note 22, at 1018 n.113 (2015) (noting that Delaware, Mississippi, Tennessee, New Jersey, Cook County, Illinois, Georgia, and Iowa retained
limited, separate procedures or courts for actions in equity).
56
Joiner & Geddes, supra note 53, at 1088 (“[M]erger does not affect substantive law.”); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949)
(“Notwithstanding the [procedural] fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.”).
57
See William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 489
(1938) (“Equitable defenses do not become legal defenses under code merger . . . .”); Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16
(1985) (noting in dicta “that application of the equitable defense of laches in an
action at law would be novel indeed . . . .”).
58
Bray, supra note 22, at 999 (“In many areas of the law, such as contracts,
the defenses that were available at law and those available in equity have been
assimilated.”).
59
See Clarksburg Tr. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 40 F.2d 626, 632 (4th
Cir. 1930); see also Cook, supra note 51, at 650 (collecting cases where equitable
cross-actions were available to enjoin suits at law).
60
See Clarksburg Tr. Co., 40 F.2d at 632 (“[W]e regard it as well settled that,
where parties have agreed upon a contract, but in reducing it to writing fail to
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of other originally equitable principles were incorporated as defenses at law prior to merger, including the doctrine of equitable estoppel.61
Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court cases, discussed in more detail below, leave open how the distinction between law and equity
has carried into the modern day in patent cases.62
2. THE UNIQUE COURSE OF EQUITY PROCEDURE IN PATENT
LAW BY STATUTE
Even prior to the federal merger of all pleadings in law and equity in 1938,63 law and equity charted a unique course in patent
cases. Through the Patent Act of 1870, Congress granted courts sitting in equity the power to award the patentee’s actual damages in
patent cases, in addition to the equitable remedies of injunction and
accounting or restitution,64 and to increase the award of damages in
its discretion:
embody it in the written instrument through mutual mistake, equity will reform
the instrument as written to make it conform to their true agreement.”); see also
James Barr Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences, 9 HARV. L. REV.
49, 51 (1895-1896) (discussing role of equity in contract law, noting “from very
early times, equity would grant a permanent unconditional injunction against an
action [at law] upon a specialty [contract] got by fraud . . . .”).
61
See Hinton, supra note 51, at 721 (“Formerly, a defendant, when sued at
law, had no defense on the ground of equitable estoppel, but was forced into equity for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action. In the course of
time, however, in spite of theoretical objections and practical difficulties, equitable estoppels became generally recognized as defenses at law . . . .”).
62
See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 961 (2017); Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663,
678 (2014).
63
See supra note 55 and accompanying text; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Merge Equity and Common Law, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-merge-equity-and-common-law (last
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
64
This equitable remedy of an accounting of the infringer’s profits is no
longer available; in 1946 Congress passed an amendment to the patent act that
limited monetary recovery to “damages” to the patentee resulting from the infringement. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946)) (current version available at 35 U.S.C. § 284);
see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505–
06 (1964) (explaining history and purpose of statutory change that eliminated an
accounting of infringer’s profits as a damages remedy).
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[T]he court shall have power, upon bill in equity filed
by any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of courts of equity,
to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable;
and upon a decree being rendered in any such case
for an infringement, the claimant [complainant] shall
be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be
accounted for by the defendant, the damages the
complainant has sustained thereby, and the court
shall assess the same or cause the same to be assessed
under its direction, and the court shall have the same
powers to increase the same in its discretion that are
given by this act to increase the damages found by
verdicts in actions upon the case . . . .65
Therefore, rather than bringing separate actions in law to recover
damages and in equity to obtain an injunction and other equitable
relief, patentees could obtain both remedies from the same action if
they sued in equity.66 However, the Patent Act of 1870 did not similarly grant courts in actions at law the ability to award equitable
remedies.67 As a result, many patent actions from 1870 until at least
the federal merger of legal and equitable pleading in 1938 were
brought in courts of equity.68

65

Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
See id.
67
See id.
68
See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 457, 470 (1938) (“After 1870 patentees resorted to actions at law with decreasing frequency until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringement suits
became for all practical purposes exclusive.”); Lemley, supra note 46, at 1704
(noting that even after merger of legal and equitable pleading, juries rarely decided more than damages in patent cases for several decades).
66
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The Codification vs. Flexibility of Patent Law and Equity

1. IS PATENT LAW DECISIONAL LAW, STATUTORY LAW, OR
BOTH?
Although patent law in the United States federal system began
with the Constitution,69 it continued both through statutory and decisional law, in courts of both law and equity, that changed over its
hundreds of years of history.70 The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries . . . .”71 The First Congress acted quickly on this power by passing the Patent Act of 1790, which contained some of the basic contours of patent law including, inter alia, the requirement to clearly
describe the patented invention in exchange for a right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention and the requirement that the invention be “useful” and “not before known or
used.”72 In the Patent Act of 1793, Congress added, among other
changes, a provision that “simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall
not be deemed a discovery,”73 which historical scholarship traces as
the origin of the obviousness doctrine in United States patent law.74
These statutory origins formed the basis for later decisional law developments of the precise contours of these doctrines.75
69

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Nard, supra note 8, at 61. Before the formation of federal patent law,
several states began to issue patents, which often resulted in conflicting rights
between different inventors from state to state. Id. (discussing key historical
events in development of United States patent law).
71
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
72
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
73
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793).
74
See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (2007). Some others view obviousness as arising entirely
from decisional law, but although decisional law played an important role in the
development of obviousness, decisional law was not its sole source. See Patent
Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793).
75
See Duffy, supra note 74, at 38 (discussing the role of decisional law in
obviousness); Nard, supra note 8, at 53 (noting the large role of decisional law in
development of the patent law).
70
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In many areas of law outside of patent law, the contours of the
law are set out more specifically in the statutory text than they are
in patent law.76 For example, in copyright law, which has a significant body of decisional law around the defense of fair use, the statutory text sets out the specific factors to be considered by courts in
this analysis.77 In contrast, the current statutory provision for obviousness in patent law lists no factors for consideration and instead
relies on broad references to what “would have been obvious.”78
This provision is not unbounded, however, merely because the statutory text does not set forth verbatim the factors to be considered—
it was framed by a body of decisional law (originally deriving from
statute) that was later codified and modified by Congress in amendments to the Patent Act.79

76

See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Id.
78
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as
set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not
be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.”); see also Nard,
supra note 8, at 72 (citing Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314
U.S. 84, 91 (1941)) (noting that Supreme Court, during a particularly anti-patent
period in 1930s and 1940s, enhanced requirement of invention).
79
The 1793 Act’s obviousness provision stating what “shall not be deemed a
discovery” was eliminated in 1836, Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 120
(1836), after which decisional law that had formed based on that provision nevertheless continued to be cited and developed in decisional law. Duffy, supra note
74, at 36, 38–41 (discussing historical development of obviousness through common law, including after elimination of the 1793 standard, such as in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850), and in time leading up to 1952 Patent Act).
In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress codified the obviousness doctrine as it had
developed in the decisional law in some respects, such as the requirement that a
patent must not be “obvious at the time the invention as made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art.” Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103). However, the statutory provision also
clamped down on the heightened standards for inventive genius that developed in
the early twentieth century decisional law by stating that “[p]atentability shall not
be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.” Id.; see Nard, supra
note 8, at 72 (discussing intent to eliminate enhanced invention requirement of
Cuno Eng’g Corp., 314 U.S. at 91).
77
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Scholars have urged that, because of the patent code’s broad language and lack of specified rules or factors, in addition to analogizing the patent code to the broad language of the antitrust statutes, the
patent code “is a common law enabling statute.”80 These scholars
argue that the patent statutes leave room for the development of patent law doctrines “emanating solely from Article III’s province,”
outside the statutory text.81 However, even if this was once true early
in patent law’s development, in 1952, Congress amended the Patent
Act in part in an attempt to stabilize the decisional law of patents
such that, under a traditional approach to statutory interpretation,
much of what seems from a surface reading of the text to be a common law enabling statute would actually codify and set boundaries
upon doctrines based on prior imputed law.82
The incorporation and stabilization of decisional law through
codification is possible under the statutory interpretative canon of
imputed common law meaning.83 The terms of a statute are often
understood according to the plain meaning of those statutory terms
at the time of enactment.84 When a term in a statute has an
80

See Nard, supra note 8, at 53, 59 (“United States patent law is designed to
invite, indeed require, a strong judicial voice.”); see Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at
801 (stating by analogy to Sherman Act that patent law “has always depended on
common law elaboration . . . .”).
81
See Nard, supra note 8, at 53.
82
See Federico, supra note 27, at 166 (“The [P]atent [A]ct of 1952 . . . stems
from two movements, one to amend the patent laws, and the other to revise and
codify the laws of the United States.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980) (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress
endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial
rules that had governed prior to that time.”).
83
See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554-557 (1994); Sekhar
v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013).
84
See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (“[W]hen the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.”); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)
(“That which it meant when adopted it means now.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012)
(“In their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at
the time they were written—with the understanding that general terms may embrace later technological innovations.”). Although courts have not always followed a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, over the last several
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established meaning in decisional law at the time of enactment,
however, under the canon of imputed common law meaning, the
term takes the meaning that it had in decisional law, along with the
contours and exceptions that are applied in decisional law.85 In other
words, there are two ways for Congress to place limits upon a
decades modern Supreme Court cases have increasingly used textualism as the
primarily lens of statutory interpretation. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1291–93, 1304 (2010); James J. Brudney
& Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220,
222 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1971, 1981 (2005); see also Christa J. Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Normative Analysis, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–37 (2018)
[hereinafter Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel] (discussing Supreme Court’s shift
to a textualist approach and normative justifications for the same).
85
See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016)
(“[I]t is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication, Congress
intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it
uses.”) (quoting Sekhar, 570 U.S. at 732); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23
(1999); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992) (quoting Morissette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached
to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In
such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)) (“[W]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 320–21 (“A statute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law
meaning”); Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) (“For in the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used that word
in the statute in its common-law sense.”); McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black)
459, 469 (1861) (quoting Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day 166, 211–12 (Conn. 1808))
(“[W]henever our Legislature use a term without defining it . . . they must be supposed to use it in the sense in which it is understood in the English law.”); see also
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (“Under the general
rule that a common-law term comes with its common-law meaning, we cannot
conclude that Congress intended to ‘drop’ the heightened standard of proof from
the presumption simply because § 282 fails to reiterate it expressly.”). This canon
is distinct from the canon against interpretation in derogation of the common law.
See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).

20

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

statutory doctrine: to spell out those limits in the text or to incorporate those limits as they are applied in decisional law.86
Under the traditional approach to statutory interpretation that often predominates in the modern Supreme Court, the analysis of imputed decisional law must “begin with the state of the common
law . . . when [the statute] was enacted.”87 For example, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, the Supreme Court determined that,
although the common law of negligence had developed in the eight
decades since enactment of the statute at issue, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, the standard for negligence incorporated
into the statute was limited to negligence as it was established in the
common law at the time of enactment.88 In Sekhar v. United States,
the Supreme Court considered, when trying to determine the type of
conduct that qualified as “extortion” under the Hobbs Act, inter alia,
that, “[a]s far as is known, no case predating the Hobbs Act—English, federal, or state—ever identified conduct such as that charged
here as extortionate.”89 This does not preclude the application of
steady law to new facts, but it means that courts examining the reach
of a doctrine under the traditional approach would consider the imputed precedent as a potential limitation on the scope of those doctrines.90 Patent law is one area of law where a significant debate
86

See Evans, 504 U.S. at 259–60 (1992) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached
to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In
such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.”(emphasis added)).
87
See Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 554. But see Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429,
436 (1994) (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1936)) (“A su[b]stantial number of statutory cases decided
during October Term 1993 offered the Court a choice between treating statutes as
static, isolated instructions from higher authority, and regarding them as part of a
‘unified system of judge-made and statute law.’ It tended to make the former
choice, one that segregates statutes from the common law. [I]n the process, it diminishes both statute and common law, both legislature and court.”).
88
Consolidated Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 554–57.
89
Sekhar, 570 U.S. at 733.
90
See Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339 (1941) (“Old crimes,
however, may be committed under new conditions. Old laws apply to changed
situations.”); see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 80.
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exists as to the impact of codification on the law and the weight to
be given to pre-codification decisional law because, as explored below, a body of decisional law existed prior to the Patent Act of 1952.
2. THE SURPRISING CONFORMITY OF EQUITY
One might assume, based on the origins of equity in pleas toward
conscience and relief from law,91 that reference to equitable doctrines in a statute is also a reference to principles that are entirely
flexible, changeable, able to adapt to any scenario, and able to prevent any injustice committed under the law.92 However, modern equity is more constrained than its origins suggest.93 Under modern
approaches, “courts of equity must be governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.”94 Even those cases that espouse
flexibility in equity nevertheless apply standards and tests for defining the scope of an established set of equitable doctrines and attempt
to follow precedent.95
91

See Subrin, supra note 19, at 918 (noting the origins of equity in requests
for relief from the tyranny of law); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (Sweet 1836) (quoting seventeenth century jurist Hugo Grotius as saying that equity is “the correction of that,
wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.”).
92
See Bray, supra note 22, at 1011, 1016, 1018 (asserting that, historically,
“equity had decisions, principles, even rules” but “no text that had been made
supreme law through ratification,” making determining any consistent precedent
of courts of equity “a fool’s errand” that can at best generate “an artificial history
of equity.”).
93
See DAVIES & VIRGO, supra note 40, at 4 (“But, over the years, Equity
became more rule-based and principled, with identifiable doctrines being recognized. This was largely because the Equity jurisdiction was transferred from the
Chancellor to judges, whose decisions had precedent for future decisions, so that
like cases could be treated alike.”); Main, supra note 43, at 448 (“The administration of equity, much like the administration of law became bound and confined
by the channels of its own precedents and the technicalities of its own procedures.”).
94
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 127 (1995)). “[T]he fact that the writ
has been called an ‘equitable’ remedy . . . does not authorize a court to ignore this
body of statutes, rules, and precedents.” Id.
95
See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244–47
(1933) (applying equitable principle of unclean hands, setting forth standards under which it applies, and determining whether facts fit within the scope of doctrine
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Indeed, precedent and standards in the application of equitable
principles are paramount to the rule of law.96 Although equity sometimes has characteristics of discretion, “[d]iscretion is not whim, and
limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the
basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.”97
As the Supreme Court has stated,“[T]he alternative is to use each
equity chancellor’s conscience as a measure of equity, which alternative would be as arbitrary and uncertain as measuring distance by
the length of each chancellor’s foot.”98
as applied in prior precedent); Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 658 (1912) (beginning a statement of standards applicable to equitable relief from judgment with
following preface: “Without attempting to draw any precise line to which courts
of equity will advance, and which they cannot pass . . . .”); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 237 (1892) (stating that judicial discretion to determine
reach of equity is “exercised, it is true, according to the settled principles of equity,
and not arbitrarily or capriciously, and always with reference to the facts of the
particular case”); see also Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 127 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that, as early as the founding, “equity had developed into a precise legal system encompassing certain recognized categories of cases . . . .”). But see Bray,
supra note 22, at 1011, 1016, 1018 (asserting that, historically “equity had decisions, principles, even rules,” but “no text that had been made supreme law
through ratification,” making determining any consistent precedent of courts of
equity “a fool’s errand” that can at best generate “an artificial history of equity . . . .”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (stating
that “[f]lexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished” equitable jurisdiction).
96
See Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 323.
97
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139
(2005)).
98
Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 323. The often-repeated caution not to measure equity
by the “chancellor’s foot” is a reference to the following commentary reflecting
the flexible equity of seventeenth century England:
1. Equity in law is the same that the spirit is in religion, what
everyone pleases to make it. Sometimes they go according to
conscience, sometimes according to law, sometimes according
to the rule of court.
2. Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, know
what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him
that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity.
‘Tis all one, as if they should make the standard for the measure
we call a foot, a chancellor’s foot. What an uncertain measure
would this be. One chancellor has a long foot, another a short
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Moreover, some argue that constraints upon courts of equity
were a consideration as early as the formation of the federal judiciary.99 At the founding, after facing criticism by Anti-Federalists that
the proposed equity jurisdiction of federal courts would grant too
much power unconstrained by law, Alexander Hamilton stated, “To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them . . . .”100 English commentators likewise noted
that if courts of equity were not constrained by precedent, their
“powers would have become too arbitrary to have been endured in
a country like this, which boasts of being governed in all respects by
law and not by will.”101
Equitable doctrines have been subject to limits and standards for
at least one hundred years.102 A traditional statutory analysis of provisions that incorporate equitable doctrines will, therefore, need to
consider what limits and standards were applicable to these

foot, a third an indifferent foot; ‘tis the same thing in the chancellor’s conscience.
THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDON 60–61 (Samuel Harvey Reynolds ed., Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1892).
99
See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing federal
courts generally). Hamilton gave this reassurance in response to disputes between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the scope of equity jurisdiction in Article III
of the constitution, when Anti-Federalists expressed concern that federal equity
courts would have too much power if they were not constrained by precedent. See
id.; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining history of dispute between Federalists and Anti-Federalists regarding Article III of the Constitution); Morley, supra note 45, at 231 (quoting LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 244
(Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981)) (noting that Anti-Federalists warned that equitable
powers would enable federal judges to simply “step into his shoes of equity, and
give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate . . . .”); see also U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity . . . .”).
101
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440
(Portland, Thomas B. Wait, & Co. 1807).
102
See DAVIES & VIRGO, supra note 40, at 4.
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doctrines in prior decisional law.103 Although the substantive law, at
the time of enactment, might have incorporated a degree of discretion that could perhaps be imputed and carried over into modern interpretations, the broad contours of the doctrine may be limited by
prior cases under traditional interpretive methods.104
C.

Statutory Interpretive Regimes: Dynamic Versus
Traditional

1. DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Professor William Eskridge urged courts to engage in “dynamic
statutory interpretation” this is an approach under which courts consider changes in societal and legal norms in determining the interpretation of legal texts.105 Under the dynamic statutory interpretation approach, courts would follow the text of a statute when it is
unambiguous; however, what a statute “ought to mean in terms of
the needs and goals of our present day society” can outweigh other
interpretive perspectives that are traditionally used to resolve ambiguity or fill gaps, such as perspectives that look to the intent of the
legislature or textualist canons.106 Indeed, Professor Eskridge urges
“original legislative expectations” should not control meaning
“when the statute is old and generally phrased and the societal or
legal context of the statute has changed in material ways.”107 Professor Eskridge’s dynamic approach is a milder variation of that of
then-professor, now judge, Guido Calabresi, who proposed that in
103

See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416–17 (1975) (quoting
Eldon, L.C., in Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818) (stating that “when
Congress invokes the Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative
purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent
with those purposes and not ‘equity [which] varies like the Chancellor’s foot’”
and concluding that reference in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to court’s discretion to award back pay or other equitable relief did not mean that court’s discretion was unfettered by standards or shielded from review).
104
See DAVIES & VIRGO, supra note 40, at 4; see also Main, supra note 43, at
448; Nard, supra note 8, at 53.
105
Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1479; see also Sunstein, supra note 7, at 412
(arguing for a moderate dynamic approach that looks first to textual and interpretive canons).
106
Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1480–81 (quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors
Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
107
Id. at 1481.
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an “age of statutes” courts should nevertheless retain powers to develop law as though statutes were no more than prior common law
precedent, including in narrow cases, by engaging in “conscious[]
review[]” of statutory text to ensure it meets present-day goals.108
These flexible approaches evoke English law’s “equity of the statute,” which was used in England prior to the eighteenth century to
justify exceptions or extensions of statutes based on the fairness of
a case.109
2. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES: THE FAITHFUL AGENT
In contrast with the dynamic approach, one traditional interpretive approach in American law urges that courts interpreting statutes
are presumed to be Congress’s “faithful agents,” discerning and applying statutory texts in service of Congress’s directive.110 The
choice of a theory of interpretation incorporates a choice of the appropriate, respective authority of Congress and the courts under our
Constitution.111 Critics of a dynamic approach urge that the U.S.
Constitution broke from English practice in part because of a view
that limiting judicial power and allocating lawmaking authority into
the hands of a legislative branch would promote rule of law.112 Under the traditional view, the formalization of bicameralism and presentment in the Constitution also militates against judicial lawmaking outside this process.113 Proponents of purposivism, intentionalism, and textualism all seek to discern Congress’s directive under a
faithful agent approach to interpretation; however, each uses different tools to attempt to do so.114

108

CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 2.
See Manning, supra note 7, at 30.
110
See id. at 5; see Sunstein, supra note 7, at 415; see Zeppos, supra note 12,
at 1313.
111
See Schacter, supra note 13, at 593; Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 636–37.
112
See Manning, supra note 7, at 57.
113
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States . . . .”); see Manning, supra note 7, at
57–58.
114
See Manning, supra note 7, at 6–7; see also Sunstein, supra note 7, at 415–
34.
109
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II.
APPLICATIONS OF EQUITY IN PATENT LAW
Most of equity in patent law today is governed by equitable doctrines that were broadly incorporated into statutory text by reference
to prior decisional law, where they originated. For example, the Patent Act of 1836 provided that the availability of equitable relief in
patent law would be determined “according to the course and principles of courts of equity.”115 As discussed below, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, decisional law developed that
set forth the standards and structural contours of several particular
equitable defenses.116 Defenses such as laches, estoppel, unclean
hands, and misuse were then imputed into the 1952 Patent Act’s reference to the defense of unenforceability (and in some cases also
modified by the statute, such as in the statutory exceptions to patent
misuse). The determination of whether and how equitable doctrines
were incorporated into the statutory text, and whether the doctrines
can extend past their historical roots after incorporation, has immense impact: If the reach of an equitable defense is determined to
extend into actions at law, the defense can render the entirety of an
infringement verdict—including years of proven past violations of
the patentee’s rights—uncollectable.117 In contrast, an equitable defense that does not reach into law would, in the modern era, only

115
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 120 (1836). The portion of the
current patent code setting forth the scope of the injunction remedy for patent
infringement, provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (interpreting this provision as requiring that courts granting an injunction apply a “traditional four-factor test” where “[a] plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). There is no similar reference to
equity in the portion of the Patent Act that provides the damages remedy for infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . .”).
116
See infra Part II.B.–F.; Nard, supra note 8, at 53–54.
117
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014).
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extend to equitable or prospective relief such as the right to injunction.118
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has yet to define the impact of codification of many of these equitable defenses. The Supreme Court recently determined that the equitable defense of laches
is not available to bar damages in actions at law within the applicable statute of limitations; however, it left open whether laches might
result in unenforceability under different circumstances.119 The Supreme Court has also noted that equitable estoppel, which barred
actions at law before the merger of law and equity, remains available
to bar actions at law.120 However, the Supreme Court has not decided to what extent substantive equitable defenses such as unclean
hands, inequitable conduct, or misuse are applicable in actions at
law and to what extent any of these defenses can expand to new
scenarios unlike those applicable in the decisional law at the time of
enactment. Most recently, in 2019, the Court denied certiorari in
Merck & Co. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., which had posed the question
of whether and under what circumstances unclean hands could bar
damages at law.121
As litigants begin to press courts to apply equitable defenses to
bar entire actions for patent litigation or extend these doctrines in
other ways, courts will need to decide how to apply these defenses.122 However, to apply these nuanced doctrines accurately,
118

See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 966–67 (2017).
119
See id. at 967.
120
See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 684 (“The gravamen of estoppel, a defense long
recognized as available in actions at law, is misleading and consequent loss.”)
(internal citations omitted); Hinton, supra note 51, at 721 (“Formerly, a defendant, when sued at law, had no defense on the ground of equitable estoppel, but
was forced into equity for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action.
In the course of time, however, in spite of theoretical objections and practical difficulties, equitable estoppels became generally recognized as defenses at
law . . . .”); see also Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 78 (1880) (discussing application of equitable estoppel in an action at law).
121
Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1233, 1247 (Fed. Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).
122
See SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 967–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1479; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 412. For example, litigants might attempt to extend equitable defenses to bar remedies based on the
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courts must engage not only with the equities of a particular case but
also with statutory history, doctrinal history, and the appropriateness
of given interpretive lenses. This Part seeks to set out the statutory
history and historical decisional law around each of these defenses
to ease that burden.
A.

Section 282: Statutory Basis for Unenforceability Defenses
The Patent Act provides a statutory right to a civil action to recover for patent infringement: “A patentee shall have remedy by
civil action for infringement of his patent.”123 However, this right is
not inviolable because section 282 of the Patent Act makes available
certain “defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent.”124 Among other defenses, such as noninfringement and invalidity for failure to comply with the preconditions for
patentability listed in the patent statute, section 282 provides that
“unenforceability” of a patent shall be a defense:
(b) Defenses.—The following shall be defenses in
any action involving the validity or infringement of
a patent and shall be pleaded:
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability.
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on
any ground specified in part II as a condition for
patentability.
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for
failure to comply with—
(A) any requirement of section 112, except
that the failure to disclose the best mode shall
not be a basis on which any claim of a patent
may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise
unenforceable; or
assertion of large numbers of patents, high pricing of patented goods, or the sending of numerous cease and desist letters.
123
35 U.S.C. § 281.
124
35 U.S.C. § 282(b).
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(B) any requirement of section 251.
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this
title.125
The text of the patent statute provides no definition of what constitutes a defense of “unenforceability” and what the legal effect of an
unenforceability defense would be.126 In this circumstance, the statutory interpretive canons, as currently applied by the Supreme
Court, would direct the analysis both to a review of statutory history
and considerations of the standards and limitations of the referenced
doctrine under established decisional law at the time of enactment.127
125

Id.
See id.
127
Supra Part I.B.; see also Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579
U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013)) (“[I]t
is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.”);
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999) (imputing a requirement of materiality from common law test for fraud to a statute using an undefined term “defraud”); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992) (quoting Morissette,
342 U.S. at 263 (1952)) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions,
not as a departure from them.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
322 (1992) (“[W]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms . . . .”) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
739 (1989)); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 320–22 (“A statute that uses a
common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning” although the common law that will be imputed is that from either the Supreme Court
or from a “uniform interpretation” by other courts); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (“Under the general rule that a common-law term
comes with its common-law meaning, we cannot conclude that Congress intended
to ‘drop’ the heightened standard of proof from the presumption simply because
§ 282 fails to reiterate it expressly.”); Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655
(1962) (“For in the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that
Congress used that word in the statute in its common-law sense.”); McCool v.
126
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Although legislative history is not a primary source of statutory
meaning under current Supreme Court approaches,128 the legislative
history, if used here, would reinforce approaches that look to or incorporate decisional law. Specifically, in congressional statements,
legislators noted that the addition of unenforceability was meant to
codify the decisional law of unenforceability that existed at the time
of enactment:
The Senate amendments are primarily technical. The
addition of the words “or unenforceability”—this is
the subject matter of the committee amendment No.
3—will place in the code this word which has been
used in numerous court decisions under the section
in question.129
When asked whether “the bill change[s] the law in any way or only
codif[ies] the present patent laws,” the senator that entered the
above-quoted statement responded, “It codifies the present patent
laws.”130
Looking closer at statutory history,131 defenses to patent infringement were previously set out by statute in the Patent Act of
1870:

Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 459, 469 (1861) (quoting Chester, 3 Day at 211–12)
(“[W]henever our Legislature use a term without defining it . . . they must be supposed to use it in the sense in which it is understood in the English law.”).
128
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. at 568 (stating
that, under Supreme Court’s current approach to statutory interpretation, “the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other
extrinsic material.”).
129
98 CONG. REC. 9249, 9323 (July 4, 1952) (statements of Sen. McCarran).
130
Id.; see Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980)
(“[I]n its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in
part, to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial rules that had governed prior to that time.”); see also Federico, supra note 84, at 166 (“The patent
act of 1952 [this title] stems from two movements, one to amend the patent laws,
and the other to revise and codify the laws of the United States.”).
131
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 256 (stating that statutory history,
i.e., amendments or repeal of provisions over time, may be considered when interpreting a statute and history of a statute is presumed to be known by Congress
when amending a statute).
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And be it further enacted, That in any action for infringement the defendant may plead the general issue, and having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or his attorney, thirty days before, may prove on
trial any one or more of the following special matters:—
First. That for the purpose of deceiving the public the
description and specification filed by the patentee in
the patent office was made to contain less than the
whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or
more than is necessary to produce the desired effect;
or,
Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for that which was in fact invented
by another, who was using reasonable diligence in
adapting and perfecting the same; or,
Third. That it had been patented or described in some
printed publication prior to his supposed invention or
discovery thereof; or,
Fourth. That he was not the original and first inventor
or discoverer of any material and substantial part of
the thing patented; or,
Fifth. That it had been in public use or on sale in this
country, for more than two years before his application for a patent, or had been abandoned to the public. . . .
And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in
equity for relief against an alleged infringement; and
proofs of the same may be given upon like notice in
the answer of the defendant, and with the like effect.132

132
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (codified as amended
at 60 Rev. Stat. § 4920 (1874)).
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The 1870 statute includes no mention of unenforceability, although
it included several defenses based on deception in obtaining a patent.133 This provision was not further amended until the Patent Act
of 1952, which inter alia, added the concept of unenforceability,
amending section 282 to its current form.134 There are two ways in
which the modifications made in 1952 were potentially significant
as to the reach of equitable defenses.135
First, the addition of unenforceability invokes more and different defenses than the previous defenses of deception in obtaining a
patent. Specifically, a limited defense was previously available under the 1870 statute136 for deceptively obtaining a patent invented
by another person or deceptively claiming something different than
one invented (and deception in obtaining a patent was mentioned in
the statutes, although did not serve as a full defense, between 1790
and 1870, as discussed further in the inequitable conduct section).137
Under the statute as written in 1870, this deception functioned not
only to bar equitable claims but also claims at law.138 Given this
outcome, deception in obtaining a patent beyond the scope of one’s
invention might more accurately be described as a species of invalidity than an equitable defense.139
133

See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 282); see also S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 9 (1952), reprinted
in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402–03. The legislative committee reports urge that
at a high level the change did not materially alter the statute. See S. REP. NO. 821979 at 9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2403 (stating that “[t]he
defenses to a suit for infringement are stated in general terms, changing the language in the present statute, but not materially changing the substance”); H.R.
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10 (1952) (explaining that five defenses named in R.S. 4920
the Patent Act of 1870 are omitted and replaced by a broader paragraph specifying
defenses in general terms).
135
See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 282); infra Part II.C.
136
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 54, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
137
Infra Part II.C.
138
See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208. (“[T]he like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in equity for relief against an alleged infringement [or] in the answer of the defendant . . . .”).
139
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food & Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 175–76 (1965) (“[A] person sued for infringement may challenge the validity
of the patent on various grounds, including fraudulent procurement.”).
134
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The 1952 Patent Act added something more: As noted in the
congressional floor statements, the defense of unenforceability invoked the word as it “ha[d] been used in numerous court decisions.”140 At the time of the Patent Act’s enactment, unenforceability encompassed unclean hands (such as severe litigation misconduct, bribery, or manufacture or suppression of evidence that related
to the request for relief sought),141 a derivative of unclean hands
termed “patent misuse” (anticompetitive conduct in excess of the
patent scope),142 and procedural fairness doctrines (such as laches
and estoppel).143 Providing reassurance that these are the defenses
referred to by the term “unenforceability,” two years after the 1952
Patent Act’s enactment, one of its drafters stated that section 282
“would include . . . equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and
unclean hands”:
The defenses which may be raised in an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent are
specified in general terms, by the second paragraph
of section 282, in five numbered items. Item 1 specifies “Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement, or unenforceability” (the last word was
added by amendment in the Senate for greater clarity); this would include the defenses such as that the
patented invention has not been made, used or sold
by the defendant; license; and equitable defenses
such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands . . . .All
the defenses usually listed in textbooks on patent law
may be placed in one or another of the enumerated
categories, except a few which are no longer applicable in view of changes in the new statute.144
The Supreme Court’s current approach to statutory interpretation
would dictate looking to these doctrines as they existed at the time
of enactment, as is examined in detail in the sections below.145
140
141
142
143
144
145

98 CONG. REC. 9249, 9323 (1952) (statements of Sen. McCarran).
Infra Part II.D.
Infra Part II.F.
Infra Part II.B.–C.
Federico, supra note 27, at 215–16.
Supra Part I.B.
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Second, when replacing the 1870 Patent Act with the 1952 Patent Act, Congress eliminated its statement that the listed “defenses
may be pleaded in any suit in equity for relief against an alleged
infringement” or “in the answer of the defendant, and with the like
effect,” i.e., as a defense in an action at law, and left in its place only
that “the following shall be defenses in any action.”146 Both the text
and legislative history are silent on whether, as a result of this
change, what was referred to as unenforceability at the time would
now act to bar all legal claims.147 There are three possible ways to
interpret this change. First, the phrase “defenses in any action” could
mean that these defenses would apply equally and substantively to
law or equity, but this would be contrary to the interpretation of similar language used in the first steps toward the merger of law and
equity, whereby the mere procedural availability of a defense in any
action did not necessarily make that defense sufficient to bar all legal claims.148 As a second alternative, the removal of this statement
could mean that the listed matters would no longer constitute a defense to both law and equity—only those described as invalidity
would apply to both, whereas unenforceability would only refer to
equitable relief149. However, the differences between the 1870 and
1952 language are not sufficiently clear to presume such a stark
change in meaning. As a third alternative, courts could read the statutory lack of clarity as requiring either, under a dynamic approach,
courts to determine the boundaries or, under a faithful agent approach, courts to examine the decisional law available at the time to
determine the reach of defenses with previously established meanings in common law. Under the third approach, courts would not
assume that facts sufficient to support restriction of equitable relief
146

Compare 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) with Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16
Stat. 198, 208.
147
See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 8–9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2402–03; see H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10 (1952); see Federico, supra note
27, at 215.
148
35 U.S.C. § 282(b); see Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat’l. Bank, 260 U.S.
235, 242 (1922) (stating that 1915 Law and Equity Act, which made equitable
defenses available in actions at law, did not effect a substantive change).
149
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 256 (noting that when an amendment of a statute makes a substantive change to language of statutory provision,
amendment is presumed to result in a change in meaning, as long as that reading
would not conflict with text).
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are sufficient to bar legal relief but would instead adopt a case-bycase approach that draws guidance from prior decisional law.
B.
Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel is one of the few equitable defenses that was
completely assimilated into actions at law.150 The doctrine of equitable estoppel first developed in courts of equity.151 Equitable estoppel bars recovery when a party seeking relief engages in misleading
conduct on which another relies to their detriment.152 This defense
is not unique to patent cases153 but can arise in patent cases when
the patentee communicates that it will not press an infringement
claim against the alleged infringer for specific activities.154 Previously, a party raising equitable estoppel against an action at law had
to seek the aid of a court of equity to restrain the action at law; long
before the merger of law and equity, equitable estoppel was directly
available in courts of law to bar legal relief.155 Indeed, as early as
1880, the Supreme Court stated that equitable estoppel “has been
applied in cases arising in courts of law.”156 Because equitable estoppel was available in actions at law prior to codification of unenforceability defenses in the 1952 Patent Act,157 equitable estoppel
150

See Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 77–78 (1880) (explaining that the application of equitable estoppel should not be “restricted in courts of law”).
151
See id. at 78 (discussing origins of doctrine in equity); see Hinton, supra
note 51, at 721.
152
See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51,
59 (1984); Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014).
(“The gravamen of estoppel, a defense long recognized as available in actions at
law, . . . is misleading and consequent loss.”).
153
See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
154
See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1042
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The patentee’s conduct must have supported an inference that
the patentee did not intend to press an infringement claim against the alleged infringer . . . .In the most common situation, the patentee specifically objects to the
activities currently asserted as infringement in the suit and then does not follow
up for years.”).
155
Hinton, supra note 51, at 721 (“Formerly, a defendant, when sued at law,
had no defense on the ground of equitable estoppel, but was forced into equity for
an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action. In the course of time, however, in spite of theoretical objections and practical difficulties, equitable estoppels became generally recognized as defenses at law . . . .”).
156
Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 77 (1880).
157
See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 684.

36

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

would be available to bar actions at law in cases decided under that
statute, regardless of the interpretive lens through which one viewed
equitable defenses.
C.
Laches
Laches, on the other hand, is a procedural equitable doctrine that
the Supreme Court has determined is limited in actions at law.158
Specifically, the Supreme Court held in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC that the equitable defense of laches is not available to bar damages in actions at law
within the applicable statute of limitations.159 Laches is a defense
developed in courts of equity that applies when a plaintiff acts with
“unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit.”160 In briefs
submitted to the SCA Hygiene Court, scholars and stakeholders debated alternate histories of laches and interpretations of the “unenforceability” defenses in section 282.161 Some cited cases where
courts had extended laches to bar actions at law, and yet, others
noted that there was no uniform consensus of lower courts nor a Supreme Court decision holding that laches could be extended to bar
remedies at law prior to the Patent Act.162 Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court sidestepped the question of history and determined
that the patent statute’s six-year statute of limitations, 35 U.S.C.
§ 286, precluded any equitable defense of laches that might otherwise apply to claims for damages brought within that time period.163
The Court held that “[w]hen Congress enacts a statute of limitations,
it speaks directly to the issue of timeliness . . . .”164 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court’s decision in SCA Hygiene left open the questions of
whether laches might result in unenforceability in other ways, such
158

See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 966–67 (2017).
159
Id.
160
Id. at 960.
161
See id. at 963 (discussing arguments regarding statutory interpretation of
the Patent Act’s reference to unenforceability); Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 6–7, SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S.
Ct. 954 (No. 15-927).
162
See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 963; see Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 161.
163
See SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 967.
164
Id. at 960.
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as barring only equitable remedies, what impact pre-codification
history has on the reach of equitable defenses, or whether, and in
what ways, equitable defenses can develop after codification.165
These two procedural equitable defenses, equitable estoppel and
laches, reflect two different ends of the spectrum with respect to incorporating equity into actions at law, with equitable estoppel barring all remedies at law and laches barring none under the Supreme
Court’s current approach.166 For the remaining defenses discussed
herein, the substantive defenses of unclean hands, inequitable conduct, and misuse, the Supreme Court has not fully elucidated their
reach. The history of these defenses, as discussed in the pages that
follow, is also widely misunderstood.
D.

Unclean Hands

1. LAW AS OF ENACTMENT
As of the 1952 Patent Act, unclean hands is another doctrine that
provided a remedy of patent unenforceability.167 Under the doctrine
of unclean hands, one who seeks relief from a court of equity must
come to court with “clean hands.”168 Specifically, a court of equity
may dismiss the claim for equitable relief where the party seeking
relief has committed an “unconscionable act . . . [that] has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of
the matter in litigation.”169
In a series of cases decided before the 1952 Patent Act’s enactment, the Supreme Court examined the contours of the unclean
hands doctrine in patent law, holding that the doctrine can bar assertion of a patent for unconscionable conduct, including fraud, bribery, perjury, and suppression of evidence, where the conduct is

165

See id. at 959.
See Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 77–78 (1880) (explaining that application of equitable estoppel should not be “restricted in courts of law”); see SCA
Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 964–67.
167
See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 241–47
(1933).
168
Id. at 241.
169
Id. at 245.
166
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related to the request for relief.170 Under this line of cases, a finding
of unclean hands could result in unenforceability, in whole or in part,
barring equitable claims where a party committed an unconscionable act related to the equitable relief sought171 and barring legal
claims, or providing relief from judgment at law, where a party committed fraud in obtaining the patent or the judgment, among other
narrow circumstances.172 In essence, as will be explained below, this
line of cases establishes two distinct subspecies of unclean hands:
(1) unconscionable conduct sufficient to bar equitable relief, in
which the court has some discretion, albeit constrained by the precedents of equity in light of codification in the Patent Act; and (2)
unconscionable conduct sufficient to bar legal relief, which is limited to the narrow circumstances in which a party historically could
have interposed equity against a case at law, including fraud.173
First, in 1933, the Supreme Court in Keystone held that a patentee’s manufacture and suppression of evidence in a lawsuit justified dismissal of a patent infringement suit brought in equity under
the doctrine of unclean hands.174 Although the suit at issue was
brought in a court of equity, it included requests for both an injunction and damages, as permitted in courts of equity by the Patent Act
of 1870.175 The basis for unclean hands was that, before bringing a
170

See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945) (blackmail and suppression of evidence); see Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240, 245 (1944) (manufacture and
suppression of evidence and bribery); see Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 243–
44 (bribery and suppression of evidence).
171
See Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 247 (dismissing suit for patent infringement that was brought in a court of equity).
172
See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 240, 245.
173
See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236 (1892) (declining to
grant equitable relief but not holding written instrument invalid, noting that
“whether this contract be absolutely void, as contravening public policy, or not,
we are clearly of the opinion that it does not belong to that class of contracts, the
specific performance of which a court of equity can be called upon to enforce.”);
Ames, supra note 60, at 51 (discussing limited circumstances under which equity
could be interposed to bar a contract claim at law, including fraud in the formation
of the contract).
174
Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245–47.
175
See Gen. Excavator Co. v. Keystone Driller Co., 62 F.2d 48, 48–51 (6th
Cir. 1932), aff’d, 290 U.S. 240 (1933). Courts of equity were able to provide
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prior lawsuit against another party, the patentee, suspecting that
prior use by Bernard Clutter could invalidate the patent that the patenter sought to assert, paid Mr. Clutter to suppress evidence of his
prior use and sign an affidavit declaring that such use was experimental.176 The court in the prior case did not discover the evidence
of prior public use and found the patent valid and infringed.177 The
patentee then brought a second suit against General Excavator, and
relied upon its success in the prior suit as a basis for a request for
temporary relief, which the district court granted in part.178
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined
that the patentee’s unclean hands barred equitable relief, but not necessarily legal relief, and instructed dismissal of the suit at equity
without prejudice to filing a new suit for damages at law:179
Under the above-stated principles we are of the opinion that the plaintiff should have been denied relief
in a court of equity. The decrees of the District Court
are reversed, and the causes are remanded, with instructions to dismiss the bills of complaint without
prejudice to the prosecution of suits at law, or,
damages remedies in patent infringement cases pursuant to the Patent Act of 1870,
in addition to injunction and restitutionary remedies, whereas courts of law were
only permitted to grant legal remedies. See supra § I.B.
176
Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 243. The payment for the affidavit included an additional contingent payment in the event the patent was found valid
by the court. See Gen. Excavator Co., 62 F.2d at 49. Although the patentee was
aware of the prior use before issuance of the patent, patentee’s counsel advised
him that it could be an experimental use, so patentee proceeded with patenting
without disclosing the use and only approached Mr. Clutter shortly prior to filing
the first suit. Id. at 50–51. Therefore, there was no manufacture of evidence as
part of obtaining the patent from the Patent Office. Id. at 50–51.
177
Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 242.
178
Id. (noting that district court denied temporary injunctive relief but ordered
payment of a bond to cover future restitutionary or damages awards).
179
See Gen. Excavator Co., 62 F.2d at 50–51. Prior to the creation of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, patent cases were appealed to regional circuit
courts of appeal. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (“The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction—(1) of an appeal . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party
has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”).
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indeed, to subsequent actions in equity upon the
other patents in suit.180
The Sixth Circuit’s decision also left open the possibility that a suit
not tainted by such misconduct could proceed, such as a new suit
(even perhaps one at equity) that lacks the request for temporary relief that was tainted by suppressed evidence.181
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision, including the determination that the dismissal was without prejudice
to suits at law, although the Court’s opinion did not address the distinction that the Sixth Circuit drew between application of unclean
hands in law versus in equity.182 Instead, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Keystone focused primarily on whether the unclean hands in
the prior action was sufficiently related to the second suit to justify
application of the doctrine of unclean hands to bar the second suit,
highlighting the need for a nexus between the complained-of conduct and the suit at issue.183 The Court found that it was sufficiently
related, primarily because the temporary relief in the second suit,
180

Gen. Excavator Co., 62 F.2d at 50–51 (emphases added).
See id. at 51 (“Possibly the plaintiff may now have the right to commence
anew an action in equity upon all the patents, including patent No. 1,511,114.
Upon this we express no opinion.”). In an opinion denying the request for rehearing, the appellate court further emphasized the equitable nature of the defense.
See Gen. Excavator Co., 64 F.2d at 39–40 (“Prior to the adopted of the New Equity Rules (28 USCA § 723), the question could never have arisen for a bill covering multiple causes of action would have been bad for duplicity. Such new Equity Rules are not intended to change the general nature and characteristics of a
court of equity as a court of conscience in which the granting of relief is largely
discretionary and the court is not bound by hard and fast rules. It is true that a
system of equity practice has grown up and that present-day courts are inclined to
follow precedents rather strictly. On the other hand, we have not held any of the
patents in suit invalid for adjudicated any of the rights of the parties inter sese.
The doctrine which we have applied is simply that if one, as actor, seeks to set the
judicial machinery in a court of equity in motion upon grounds in respect to which
his conduct is sullied, he will find the doors of the court closed against him.”
(citations omitted)).
182
Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 244, 247.
183
See id. at 245–47 (“But courts of equity do not make the quality of suitors
the test . . . . They do not close their doors because of plaintiff’s misconduct,
whatever its character, that has no relation to anything involved in the suit, but
only for such violations of conscience as in some measure affect the equitable
relations between the parties in respect of something brought before the court for
adjudication.”).
181
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which would be burdensome to defendants during the progress of
suit, depended on the fact that the patent was found valid and infringed in the prior suit.184
Keystone highlights that a court may bar equitable relief where
the party seeking relief commits an unconscionable act, including
bribery and suppression of evidence, that forms the basis for the request for relief.185 Keystone also provides a glimpse into the tension
that existed at the time between flexibility and conformity in equity,
holding that courts determining the appropriateness of equitable relief had discretion within limits.186 Specifically, although the Court
in Keystone stated that “[courts of equity] are not bound by formula
or restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just
exercise of discretion,” the Court also set forth conditions on that
discretion: “[C]ourts of equity do not make the quality of suitors the
test”, but rather, the act must be “unconscionable” and have an “immediate and necessary” nexus to the relief sought.187
Second, in 1944, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire
Co., the Supreme Court held that when the patentee used bribery and
manufactured evidence with the intent to defraud both the Patent
Office in issuing the patent and the courts during litigation, the doctrine of unclean hands could be used to overturn a previous judgment
of validity and infringement arising from a court of equity (where
the patentee sought both equitable relief and damages).188 The patent
applicant in Hazel-Atlas, in response to “insurmountable Patent Office opposition” to its patent application, paid a prominent trade professional to publish what he made appear to be an unbiased article
declaring the invention groundbreaking.189 Then, the Patent Office
granted the patent.190 The patentee brought suit for infringement and
184

Id. at 246–47.
See id. at 245–47.
186
Id. at 245–46.
187
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1933).
188
See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240,
249–51 (1944). Because the original suit was filed in 1928 and sought both injunction and damages, it could only have been brought in the court of equity, the
only court at the time that could grant both equitable and legal remedies. See id.
at 241 (noting that complaint “pray[ed] for an injunction against further infringement and for an accounting for profits and damages.”).
189
Id. at 240.
190
Id. at 241.
185
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lost at the district court, but on appeal relied heavily on the article to
obtain a decision from the appeals court that the patent was valid
and infringed.191 Thereafter, the parties settled, so the court did not
rule on damages.192 When the fraud was uncovered years later, the
Supreme Court reversed the prior judgment and directed judgment
to be entered against the patentee, noting, “[t]he total effect of all
this fraud, practiced both on the Patent Office and the courts, calls
for nothing less than a complete denial of relief to Hartford for the
claimed infringement of the patent thereby procured and enforced.”193
The Court in Hazel-Atlas cited a long-standing rule in equity
whereby an injunction could be entered to stop enforcement of a
judgment from any court in the event of fraud that formed the basis
of the entry of judgment.194 The Court cited cases decided outside
of patent law and well before the merger of law and equity that held
that a court in equity could enjoin a party from collecting damages
on a judgment that was based on fraud.195 For example, in one of the
cases cited in Hazel-Atlas, Marshall v. Holmes, the Court held that
where a prior judgment for damages at law was based upon “false
testimony and forged documents,” “established principles of equity”
justified “protection against the judgments alleged to have been
fraudulently obtained.”196
Another pre-merger case on which the Court in Hazel-Atlas relied held that relief from a judgment at law was available in a court
of equity where there was “something to render it manifestly unconscionable for his successful adversary to enforce the judgment,”
such as fraud in obtaining the judgment.197 The Court noted that
191

Id.
Id. at 243–244.
193
Id. at 250.
194
Id. at 244 (“From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a
rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is afterdiscovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term
of their entry.”).
195
Id. (citing Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 601 (1891)).
196
Marshall, 141 U.S. at 590, 601.
197
Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 657 (1912) (“In order to warrant the
interposition of a court of equity to restrain the enforcement of a judgment at law,
it is, of course, not sufficient for the defeated party to show that because of some
192
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such an interposition of equity could also be based on newly discovered evidence that could not have been previously discovered and
that makes maintaining the judgment unconscionable198—what today would form the basis for a retrial.199 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has noted that courts in equity in England had powers to render patents unenforceable if they were obtained by fraud.200 Contracts and
land patents that were procured by fraud could also historically be
modified or rendered invalid by a court of equity such that they
could no longer support a suit at law.201 This line of cases provides
historical support for an equitable defense of unclean hands that provides relief from judgment at law in narrow circumstances, such as
fraud in obtaining a prior court judgment or fraud in obtaining a
written instrument, such as a patent.202
In a third Supreme Court patent case on unclean hands, Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., a party obtained via blackmail the rights to another’s
newly discovered evidence pertaining to an issue in the case, or because of some
newly discovered fact that might have been put in issue, he would probably have
a better prospect of success on a retrial of the action. He must show something to
render it manifestly unconscionable for his successful adversary to enforce the
judgment.”).
198
Id. at 658 (“Without attempting to draw any precise line to which courts of
equity will advance, and which they cannot pass, in restraining parties from availing themselves of judgments obtained at law, it may safely be said that any fact
which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of
which the injured party could not have availed himself in a court of law; or of
which he might have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will justify an
application to a court of chancery.”).
199
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2).
200
See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 361 (1888) (discussing English cases and noting that “in a case of fraud in the obtaining of a patent,
a Court of Chancery, by virtue of that fact, has jurisdiction to repeal or revoke
it”).
201
Mfrs.’ Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449, 451 (1935) (noting that equitable defense of unclean hands was “inapplicable” on those facts to a contract
case brought at law, yet noting that contract was valid and no fraud was alleged
and citing cases indicating that a contract procured by fraud could justify the interposition of equity); see Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533, 535 (1877) (noting
that a court of equity could invalidate a land patent, stating that “in this class of
cases, as in all others, there exists in the courts of equity the jurisdiction to . . . relieve against frauds”).
202
See Mfrs.’ Fin. Co., 294 U.S. at 449.
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patent that it knew was obtained by false declarations of dates of
conception and reduction to practice.203 The party suppressed the
evidence of that falsity and then sought to enforce the patents in a
court of equity against the original patent owner.204 The Court held
that the “facts all add up to the inescapable conclusion that [the party
asserting the patent] has not displayed that standard of conduct requisite to the maintenance of this suit in equity” and dismissed the
suit.205 The Court noted that when unclean hands is invoked against
a litigant seeking equitable relief, the “maxim necessarily gives wide
range to the equity court’s use of discretion in refusing to aid the
unclean litigant” and “[a]ny willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of
conduct is sufficient . . . .”206
The line of cases discussed above stand for the principles that
equitable relief, such as a request for injunction, can be barred where
a party committed an unconscionable act immediately related to the
equity sought207 and legal relief can be barred if fraud formed the
basis of a legal judgment.208 If one were to apply a faithful agent
interpretive method, then these cases—particularly the cases shortly
prior to the 1952 Patent Act that resulted in unenforceability of a
patent209—would help define the unenforceability defense to patent
infringement under the 1952 Patent Act. Specifically, under this approach, the 1952 Patent Act’s reference to unenforceability would
incorporate unenforceability doctrines from the time of enactment,
along with the boundaries of these doctrines at the time.
2. LAW SINCE ENACTMENT
The Federal Circuit has further delineated the contours of the
doctrine of unclean hands since the passage of the 1952 Patent Act,
often in ways that are consistent with the reach of the doctrine under
203
See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 808–16 (1945).
204
See id.
205
Id. at 819.
206
Id. at 815.
207
See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 246–47
(1933).
208
See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245
(1944).
209
See id. at 251.
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the Supreme Court’s pre-1952 caselaw.210 For example, the Federal
Circuit has stated that a successful unclean hands defense bars only
the present suit and does not result in invalidity or unenforceability
of the patent as to other parties (except, as in the inequitable conduct
doctrine discussed below, where the conduct involves fraud in obtaining the patent).211 This is consistent with the history of the defense, which merely operated to turn a plaintiff seeking equity out
of the court of equity except in the narrow circumstances where it
could apply to bar a judgment entered at law.212 The Federal Circuit
has also determined that when the conduct at issue relates only to a
single patent in a multi-patent suit, only that patent is rendered unenforceable rather than all the patents in suit unless the misconduct
is immediately related to each other patent.213 This is consistent with
the principle stated under Keystone that unclean hands only applies
where the unconscionable act has “immediate and necessary relation
to the equity that [the plaintiff] seeks . . . .”214
Some litigants have urged courts to find unclean hands for conduct such as sending vexatious and unfounded patent infringement

210

See Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickson, & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285–86
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
211
Id. at 1287 (distinguishing inequitable conduct from unclean hands and
collecting cases where remedy for unclean hands was limited to dismissal); see
Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“While inequitable conduct before the PTO renders the patent unenforceable by
any party, the unclean hands doctrine bars only the offending party” and “only
provides a bar to relief in the case at hand.”).
212
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
213
See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 378 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“SSIH relies solely on the supposition that all of the patents are so
interrelated that [patentee’s] ‘unclean hands’ with respect to the later patents renders the [asserted] patent unenforceable. We reject this contention as a matter of
law.”); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 524 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
v. (“[FMC] can not use Foster to invoke an unclean hands defense to the entire
judicial proceeding.”); see also Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231,
1248 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019) (dismissing a second
patent in suit based on the facts at issue, but agreeing that misconduct relating to
one patent “does not defeat claims under another patent simply because they were
‘brought . . . in the same lawsuit’”).
214
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933).
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demand letters215 or filing excessive numbers of patents “intended
to create a ‘legal thicket.’”216 The doctrine of unclean hands as applied by the Supreme Court prior to codification extended only to
conduct that was “unconscionable,” such as fraud, bribery, blackmail, manufacture of evidence, and suppression of evidence.217
Whether this conduct would fall within those bounds is ultimately a
question for the court, which must consider not only which interpretive method is appropriate but also whether the facts fit within the
boundaries of the law under that method.218
The Federal Circuit has extended the doctrine of unclean hands
to bar legal relief in more than the narrow cases where this occurred
pre-1952 (fraud in obtaining the judgment of relief or fraud in obtaining the patent).219 In Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., the
Federal Circuit found that unclean hands justified summary judgment barring legal and equitable relief where, prior to suit, an attorney breached an ethical firewall to obtain information useful to patent strategy (but not material to patentability) and during suit gave
false testimony in support of validity.220 Although the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on this petition,221 this result raises the question of whether it is appropriate use the equitable defense of unclean
hands to bar legal relief based on conduct that is sufficiently egregious even when the conduct might fall short of fraud in obtaining

215
See Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1073,
1078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding unclean hands barred all relief where patentee was
“threatening its competitors with the intellectual property rights it did not own,”
but also forged assignment documents and failed to disclose the forgery in discovery).
216
Cf. Nomadix, Inc. v. Hosp. Core Servs., LLC, No. CV 14–08256 (VBKx),
2015 WL 3948804, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (finding unclean hands not
available based on allegations of a patent “‘thicket’”).
217
Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 243 (bribery and suppression of evidence); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944)
(manufacture and suppression of evidence and bribery); Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (blackmail and
suppression of evidence).
218
See Keystone Driller Co., 290 at U.S. at 245–46.
219
See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).
220
Id. at 1233, 1240, 1248.
221
Merck & Co. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).
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the judgment, i.e., if the conduct was not a but-for cause of the finding or judgment in the patentee’s favor.222
The Federal Circuit in Gilead also found that conduct before the
Patent Office could support a finding of unclean hands that bars legal relief based only on the fact that the conduct “enhanced the
claimant’s legal position as to . . . the creation . . . of the legal rights
at issue.”223 This is despite the fact that the court acknowledged the
conduct before the PTO did not amount to inequitable conduct.224
Although severe prosecution misconduct might be sufficient under
pre-1952 caselaw to bar equitable relief, nothing in the pre-1952
caselaw would have barred legal relief based on prosecution misconduct that does not rise to the level of inequitable conduct or fraud
in obtaining the patent.225 In these ways, the Federal Circuit has
adopted an approach to unclean hands that expands the doctrine beyond its pre-codification roots.226
As explored further below, two related doctrines are often said
to have developed from unclean hands: inequitable conduct and patent misuse.227 The history of unclean hands provides a critical
framework for the analysis of the proper scope of these doctrines.
E.
Inequitable Conduct
The inequitable conduct doctrine renders a patent unenforceable
and invalid if the asserted patent was obtained by materially defrauding the patent office.228 Specifically, under the Federal
222
See Gilead Scis., 888 F.3d. at 1239, 1247 (discussing balancing of equities,
relying on wrongful conduct to apply unclean hands defense).
223
Id. at 1240.
224
Id.
225
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933)
(“But courts of equity do not make the quality of suitors the test . . . . They do not
close their doors because of plaintiff’s misconduct, whatever its character, that
has no relation to anything involved in the suit, but only for such violations of
conscience as in some measure affect the equitable relations between the parties
in respect of something brought before the court for adjudication.”).
226
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“As the inequitable conduct doctrine evolved from unclean hands
cases, it came to embrace a broader scope of misconduct.”).
227
Id. (“Inequitable conduct also diverged from the doctrine of unclean
hands.”); see Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-493 (1942)
(noting the relationship between patent misuse to unclean hands).
228
Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
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Circuit’s current articulation of the standard for inequitable conduct,
a patent is unenforceable and invalid for inequitable conduct if, in
obtaining a patent, “the applicant [or patentee] misrepresented or
omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the
[Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’)]” and if the court determines
that a finding of inequitable conduct is justified after “weigh[ing]
the equities.”229 Information is material to patentability if “the PTO
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed
[prior act].”230 In other words, for information to be material, it must
be capable of rendering the patent invalid.231
The Federal Circuit has said that inequitable conduct arose as a
species of the unclean hands defense in patent law.232 However, as
will be explored in more detail below, the true history of the doctrine
is more complex and has a number of independent statutory origins
from the doctrine of unclean hands. This Part will also explore a
change made by the America Invents Act to the statutory provision
governing the validity of patent claims if other claims of the patent
are found invalid.
1. STATUTORY HISTORY OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A right to revocation of a patent for inequitable conduct-like behavior was originally codified in 1790: This patent statute, the first
in the United States, created a right for defendants to file a motion
in the district court for repeal of a patent within one year of issuance
on the ground that the patent “was obtained surreptitiously by, or
upon false suggestion.”233 Only legal remedies were available for
229

Id.
Id. at 1291.
231
See id.
232
Id. at 1287 (asserting that origins of inequitable conduct defense to patent
infringement is in unclean hands, including Keystone Driller Co., Precision Instrument, and Hazel-Atlas that are discussed above); see Gen. Electro Musical
Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)) (“The concept of inequitable conduct in patent procurement derives
from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands: that a person who obtains a patent
by intentionally misleading the PTO can not enforce the patent.”).
233
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111; see Robert J. Goldman,
Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L.
230
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patent infringement at that time (the remedies were expanded in the
early nineteenth century to include equitable remedies), and any
such motion would have been filed in a court of law.234 Additionally,
the 1790 statute provided that judgment should be entered for defendant, i.e., that there would be a defense to patent infringement “if
the concealment of part, or the addition of more than is necessary”
to what was claimed as the invention “shall appear to have been intended to mislead, or shall actually mislead the public, so as the effect described cannot be produced by the means specified . . . .”235
In 1836, amendments to the Patent Act narrowed the previously
available private right of action to revoke patents for inequitable
conduct-like behavior to what we would today call an interference
proceeding, i.e., where a party challenges whether that party or the
patentee was the first inventor.236 For most of the 1800s, however,
an action in a court sitting in equity was available to the government
to revoke a patent for fraud on the patent office.237 However, other
than as interference, no action or defense was available to
& TECH. 37, 40 (1993); Lemley, supra note 46, at 1696; David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 948 (2010). The period to file this
motion was later increased to three years. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat.
318, 323.
234
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423–24
(1908) (“[T]hough at first only a remedy at law was given for a violation of the
right, a remedy in equity was given as early as 1819.”).
235
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. 109, 111–112.
236
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123–24; see Lemley, supra
note 46, at 1699.
237
See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1333 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Prior to 1836, Congress had authorized suit for scire facias to
invalidate a patent where the suit, though brought by a private party, was under
the control of the United States. In the Patent Act of 1836, Congress re-pealed that
provision, but the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory change did not remove the United States’ ability to sue in equity to invalidate a patent, at least
where there had been fraud on the patent office.”); United States v. Am. Bell Tel.
Co., 128 U.S. 315, 372 (1888) (“[Such a suit by the United States] is so widely
different, so much more beneficial, and is pursued under circumstances so much
more likely to secure complete justice, than any defense which can be made by an
individual infringer, that it is impossible to suppose that Congress, in granting this
right to the individual, intended to supersede or take away the more enlarged remedy of the government.”); John F. Duffy, The Inequities of Inequitable Conduct:
A Case Study of Judicial Control of Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
417, 418 (2013) (discussing the history of inequitable conduct).
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individuals under the statute to use inequitable conduct to defend
against pat-ent infringement from 1836 to 1870.238
In an amendment to the patent statutes in 1870, Congress provided that certain deceitful behaviors would constitute a defense to
patent infringement:
And be it further enacted, That in any action for infringement the defendant may plead the general issue, and having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or his attorney, thirty days before, may prove on
trial any one or more of the following special matters:—
First. That for the purpose of deceiving the public the
description and specification filed by the patentee in
the patent office was made to contain less than the
whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or
more than is necessary to produce the desired effect;
or,
Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for that which was in fact invented
by another, who was using reasonable diligence in
adapting and perfecting the same; . . .
And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in
equity for relief against an alleged infringement; and
proofs of the same may be given upon like notice in
the answer of the defendant, and with the like effect.239
As noted above, the 1952 Act then removed the specific enumerations of defenses for deceitful conduct in obtaining a patent.240
The first defense from the 1870 statute was removed in favor of the
more general defense of invalidity in the 1952 statute.241 Drafter
238

Duffy, supra note 137, at 426–427.
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (codified as amended
at 60 Rev. Stat. § 4920 (1874)) (emphasis added).
240
See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 282).
241
Federico, supra note 27, at 162–63, 216.
239

2020]

EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW

51

Federico noted shortly after enactment that inadequate description
with deceitful intent became superfluous because inadequate description already resulted in invalidity; “failure to give a description
of the invention as required by section 112 is a defense without regard to intention.”242 The intent element of the second defense was
removed and the considerations of whether a patentee was the first
to invent was incorporated into the 1952 Act’s section 102(g).243
One way to interpret these changes is to conclude that inequitable
conduct, to the extent it remained available to bar legal claims, was
merged into the defense of “invalidity” in section 282.244
2. THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF SECTION 288’S DECEPTIVE
INTENT EXCEPTION ON INFECTIOUS INVALIDITY FOR
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
One might wonder why an accused infringer would still raise
inequitable conduct, which depends upon information being sufficiently material to render a patent invalid, instead of only asserting
invalidity in light of these statutory changes to the availability of
defenses regardless of deceptive intent. One reason is that, although
invalid patent claims generally do not render the other claims in a
patent infectiously invalid, some modern courts have read inequitable conduct as barring the patentee from asserting any claim in that
patent, i.e., as having infectious invalidity.245 Specifically, in
caselaw prior to the passage of the America Invents Act, the Federal
Circuit held that when one claim in a patent is tainted with inequitable conduct, the remaining claims of the patent are not enforceable.246
242

Id.
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 102(g), 66 Stat. 792, 797; Federico, supra
note 27, at 216.
244
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as amended
in 35 U.S.C. § 282).
245
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
246
See id. When the conduct at issue relates only to a single patent in a multipatent suit, in contrast, only that patent is rendered invalid or unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct unless the misconduct was material to the validity of related applications. See id.; Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The ‘554 patent is not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
243
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Section 288 of the 1952 Patent Act provided that if one patent
claim was found invalid, the remaining claims of the patent would
not be invalid, except those invalid with “deceptive intention”:
“Whenever, without deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of
the patent which may be valid.”247 Similarly, section 253 provided
that “[w]henever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered
invalid.”248 Under the statutory interpretation canon of expressio
unius the negative implication of these provisions would be that an
action may not be maintained on a patent where any claim of the
patent was found invalid with deceptive intention.249 Federico stated
that these provisions were enacted to counter a rule previously applicable under common law where “if a patent was invalid in part it
was invalid in whole, that is, if any one claim of a patent was invalid
the entire patent fell.”250
merely because its claims were improperly included in an application with other
patentable inventions that were ultimately held unenforceable for inequitable conduct.”).
247
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 288, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (1952) (current version is at 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2018)).
248
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 253, 66 Stat. 792, 809 (1952) (current version is at 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2018)).
249
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 107. Under the Negative-Implication Canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the specification of one is the
exclusion of another. Id.; see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters
Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (finding that a statute specifying that trustees
could obtain certain relief under a provision of a statute precluded others from
obtaining relief under that provision); see also United States v. Giordano, 416
U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (finding that a statute establishing that certain procedures
could be authorized by Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General excluded
others from authorizing those procedures, by negative implication).
250
Federico, supra note 27, at 208. Under the prior rule, before a patentee
could bring another suit, a patentee with an invalid claim would be required to file
a disclaimer with the Patent Office such that the patent would claim only material
that was not previously found invalid. See id. The 1952 Patent Act also provided
procedures for disclaimer of the portions of the patent that were invalid, which
likewise were not available if claims were found invalid with deceptive intent.
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 253, 66 Stat. 792, 809 (1952) (current version is at
35 U.S.C. § 253) (“Whenever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent
is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid. A patentee,
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Today, however, sections 288 and 253 of the Patent Act omit
any mention of deceptive intent: “[w]henever a claim of a patent is
invalid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim
of the patent which may be valid”251 and “[w]henever a claim of a
patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered
invalid.”252 The exception for deceptive intent was stricken from
both of these provisions by the 2011 America Invents Act.253 The
removal of the deceptive intent exception originated in the first bill
of what later became the America Invents Act, the proposed Patent
Reform Act of 2005.254 This change was later reintroduced as a
“technical amendment” in the bill offered in January 2011, which
became part of the America Invents Act.255 In floor debates, legislators noted that the elimination of the “deceptive intention” exception
related to, inter alia, “enforcing remaining valid claims if a claim is
invalidated”:
At subsections (a) through (h), section 16 of the
bill has been modified by reinserting language that
eliminates various deceptive-intent requirements that
relate to correcting the naming of the inventor or a
joint inventor, obtaining a retroactive foreign filing
license, seeking section 251 reissue, or enforcing remaining valid claims if a claim is invalidated. See
generally Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings &
Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596, 7th Cir. 1971. These
changes were first proposed in section 5 of the original Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th
Congress, and have been advocated by universities
and their technology-transfer offices. For reasons
whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein, may, on payment of the fee
required by law, make disclaimer of any complete claim, stating therein the extent
of his interest in such patent.”).
251
35 U.S.C. § 288 (2018).
252
35 U.S.C. § 253 (2018).
253
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20(e), (h), 125
Stat. 284, 334 (2011).
254
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong., § 5(c) (2005).
255
Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. § 16 (2011); see also Joe
Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 447 (2011).
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that are not entirely clear, subsequent bills maintained this section and its addition of substructure
and titles to the affected code sections, but struck the
substantive part of the section—i.e., its elimination
of the deceptive-intent requirements.
Eliminating the various deceptive-intent requirements moves the U.S. patent system away from the
19th century model that focused on the patent
owner’s subjective intent, and towards a more objective-evidence-based system that will be much
cheaper to litigate and more efficient to administer.256
The appellate court decision, Kearney, referenced in this commentary also provides some evidence that the meaning of the term
“invalid” in section 288 includes circumstances where no patent suit
at law could be maintained because of fraud in obtaining the patent,
i.e., inequitable conduct.257 Applying the 1952 version of section
288, the court in Kearney held that “actual fraud or other inequitable
conduct” falls within the deceptive intent exception of former section 288, rendering all the claims of the patent invalid.258 The court
in Kearney reasoned, “a patent procured by fraud [is] not merely
unenforceable but invalid,” citing to a Supreme Court patent-antitrust case, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and
Chemical Corp.259 Indeed, in Walker Process, the Supreme Court
rejected the holding of the lower courts that “proof of fraudulent
procurement may be used to bar recovery for infringement . . . but
not to establish invalidity.”260 The Court held that “a person sued for
infringement may challenge the validity of the patent on various
grounds, including fraudulent procurement.”261
256

157 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. March 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596
(7th Cir. 1971).
258
Id. (“Fairly read, § 288 prohibits the maintenance of any action on a patent
which includes claims which are invalid by reason of deceptive intention.”).
259
Id. at 594 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–76 (1965)).
260
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175.
261
Id. at 176 (emphasis added) (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250 (1944)).
257
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Joe Matal, a senior legislative staffer involved in drafting the
America Invents Act, stated in an article written shortly after enactment that “the repeal of the deceptive-intent bar in § 288, which allows enforcement of other claims if one is found to be invalid,
should limit the infectious invalidity that otherwise results from a
finding of inequitable conduct.”262 During the legislative process
leading up to the America Invents Act, Senator Orrin Hatch stated
that inequitable conduct “has been overpleaded and has become a
drag on the litigation process.”263 Moreover, as to other portions of
the America Invents Act, legislators stated that “[t]he term [unenforceability] should be considered to be used interchangeably with
‘invalidity’ . . . .”264 This history, including the statutory history of
changes made to section 288 and case law including Kearney265 and
Walker Process,266 could suggest that the term “invalid” in section
288 includes determinations of inequitable conduct such that, after
the America Invents Act, inequitable conduct might no longer result
in invalidity of other patent claims beyond the claims that were
fraudulently procured.
Nevertheless, even if infectious invalidity is no longer available,
accused infringers will likely continue to assert inequitable conduct
for several reasons: A finding of inequitable conduct might support
a determination that the case is sufficiently “exceptional” to justify
an award of attorney’s fees to the defendant under section 285.267 A
262

Matal, supra note 255, at 643.
153 CONG. REC. S4691 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
Matal, supra note 255, at 546.
264
157 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(quoting J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1984)) (“Whether the holding should be one of invalidity or unenforceability has
had no practical significance in cases thus far presented to this court . . . .”); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 50 (2011) (“Patents are unenforceable and invalid
if they are obtained through fraud.”).
265
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596
(7th Cir. 1971).
266
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
175–76 (1965).
267
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2018) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”); see Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 (2014) (holding that conduct need not
be “independently sanctionable” such as “inequitable conduct in procuring the
263
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finding of inequitable conduct might also form the basis of antitrust
allegations, which come with potential for treble damages.268 Discovery into inequitable conduct can also serve strategic purposes for
accused infringers by adding to the patentee’s discovery burdens,
provided that there is a legitimate basis for the accusation.269
In light of the statutory history of inequitable conduct, particularly the current version of the patent statute’s lack of any incorporation of the doctrine beyond the general requirements for validity,
inequitable conduct cannot be said to be an independent defense as
opposed to a type of invalidity. Its contours might be relevant, as
noted, to determine whether attorney’s fees270 are warranted or antitrust liability applies.271 However, these are beyond the scope of
equitable defenses or the availability of equitable relief in patent
cases. In this sense, inequitable conduct is merely “invalidity plus.”
Nevertheless, the primary contours of the doctrine as it stands in
the Federal Circuit—with a requirement that the conduct be intended to deceive the Patent Office and, if it were discovered during
prosecution, sufficient to render the patent invalid before both legal
and equitable claims are barred272—fits well within the second category of unclean hands for fraud in obtaining the instrument that
forms the basis of suit. Therefore, inequitable conduct that would
render a patent invalid would justify a bar of both legal and equitable
forms of relief under either interpretive approach.

patent” to justify a fee award, which suggests that inequitable conduct might support such an award).
268
See Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 174; see Duffy, supra note
237, at 440 (noting that inequitable conduct was not widely asserted in patent
cases until after Walker Process signaled that it could support antitrust liability).
269
See. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (providing sanctions for allegations made “for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”). Note that a patentee’s conduct might be sanctionable, even if it does not support an equitable defense.
270
Octane Fitness, LLC, 572 U.S. at 555.
271
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
272
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
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F.
Patent Misuse
Patent misuse is an unenforceability defense that is related to the
doctrine of unclean hands.273 A variety of conduct has been found
to be misuse of a patent if the court determines that the patentee has
improperly exploited the patent right beyond the scope of the patented invention or beyond the duration of the patent.274 Although
anticompetitive conduct may constitute patent misuse, the current
reach of the misuse doctrine is not coextensive with antitrust laws.275
Misuse focuses on the impact on the public interest of the patentee’s
actions to exceed the patent scope: “It . . . forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by
the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to
grant.”276 Once the misuse has been “‘purged,’” or the conduct of
the patentee no longer impermissibly exceeds the scope of the patent
right in a way that violates public policy, the patentee may again

273

C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“The defense of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands . . . . Patent misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse renders the
patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself, invalidate
the patent.”).
274
Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
A patentee’s right to exclude includes the right to exclude others from “mak[ing],
us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention, within the United
States or import[ing] into the United States any patented invention during the term
of the patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A patentee’s conduct might be found to
exceed the scope of the patent right either by going beyond the disclosed invention
(such as by tying) or beyond the granted patent’s term. See id.; see Princo Corp.,
616 F.3d at 1326.
275
See Christa J. Laser, Continuing the Conversation of “The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine”, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 104, 207,
112 (2012) (criticizing patent misuse as an overdeterrent when it applies beyond
the scope of antitrust liability); see Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1121–22 (2003) (analyzing legislative and doctrinal history
and concluding that “[s]omething less than the conduct necessary for an antitrust
tying violation might be sufficient for a finding of misuse . . . .”).
276
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); accord Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917)
(“[I]f sustained, it would be gravely injurious to that public interest, which we
have seen is more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes.”).
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seek relief.277 Patent misuse only acts as a defense to infringement
where the misuse is of the asserted patent.278
1. STATUTORY SCOPE UNDER SECTIONS 282 AND 271(D)
Although misuse is a derivative of unclean hands,279 unlike unclean hands, the doctrine of misuse was not unqualifiedly imputed
into the text of the statute.280 In addition to codifying this doctrine
in the defense of unenforceability, the 1952 Patent Act enumerated
several circumstances that would not constitute misuse, providing:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent
shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his
277

U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957)
(“[C]ourts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any
of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the
effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or ‘purged’ as the conventional saying goes.”); Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 493 (“Equity may rightly withhold its
assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper
practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent
have been dissipated.”).
278
Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding no misuse based on misrepresentations to the FTC noting that “the defense of
patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee
engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may
have anticompetitive effects. As reprehensible as BMS’s actions may be, they do
not constitute patent misuse: ‘Where the patentee has not leveraged its patent beyond the scope of rights grant by the Patent Act, misuse has not been found.’”(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
279
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
280
See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 271, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (1952)
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271, § 282).
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pat-ent rights against infringement or contributory
infringement.281
In Section 271(c), Congress defined contributory infringement as
follows:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United
States or imports into the United States a component
of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.282
In the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Congress added the following additional exceptions to misuse, arriving at the current version of section 271(d):
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent;
or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in
the relevant market for the patent or patented product
on which the license or sale is conditioned.283

281

Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 271(d), 66 Stat. 792, 811 (1952) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 271).
282
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
283
35 U.S.C. § 271(d). The statutory basis for misuse can also be said to arise
from section 271 under the statutory interpretive canon expressio unios, where the
expression of one is the exclusion of another. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84,
at 107; see Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000).
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The legislative history indicates that the 1988 amendment was made
to add exceptions to misuse beyond what existed in common law at
the time.284
2. DECISIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ENACTMENT
A series of Supreme Court cases in the early twentieth century
defines the scope of patent misuse as it existed prior to 1952, although the statute abrogated findings of misuse under certain fact
patterns seen in these cases.285
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. stands for
the principle that mere nonuse or exercise of the right to exclude
others from uses within the scope of the patent is not misuse.286 In
Continental Paper Bag, a defendant in a patent infringement suit
that was brought in equity (seeking an injunction and equitable accounting) argued that equity should be denied because the patentee
never made use of the patent other than to bring suit.287 Defendant
argued that because under the Constitution, the purpose of intellectual property is “[t]o promote the progress of science and the useful
arts,”288 a patent that is not used to make anything does not promote
such progress, does not meet the public policy goals of patents, and
should therefore not be enforced in a court of equity.289

284

See S. REP. NO. 100-492, at 14 (1988) (“The lack of clarity and predictability in application of the patent misuse doctrine and that doctrine’s potential for
impeding procompetitive arrangements are major causes for concern.”); 134
CONG. REC. 32,471 (1988) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Reform of patent
misuse will ensure that the harsh misuse sanction of unenforceability is imposed
only against those engaging in truly anticompetitive conduct.”); id. at 32,295
(statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) (“[T]he proposed modifications should
have a pro-competitive effect, insofar as they require some linkage between the
patent licensing practice and anti-competitive conduct.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204–207 (1980) (detailing legislative history of
section 271).
285
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 406.
288
Id. at 422–24; U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have
power . . . To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries . . . .”).
289
Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 422–24.
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The Supreme Court in Continental Paper Bag disagreed that
nonuse is contrary to the policy goal of patents, which the Court said
is primarily “to promote disclosure” by requiring a description of
the invention in exchange for a temporary right to exclude and stated
that the statutory right “can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness
by a prevention of its violation.”290 The Court also supported its
holding with a statutory history analysis, noting that in 1836 Congress repealed a law that required foreign persons to make use of the
patent within a year or forfeit the right and that other countries had
requirements of use, but Congress chose instead to only require disclosure in exchange for the right to exclude.291 The Court noted,
however, that it did not decide whether a situation might arise where
“in view of the public interest, a court of equity might be justified in
withholding relief by injunction . . . .”292
In a series of cases after Continental Paper Bag, the Court further delineated the proper scope of the patent grant by finding that
certain uses outside the scope of the patent grant were not infringing
uses, such as use of unpatented supplies despite that a patented machine was sold with a notice requiring purchase of supplies from the
patentee.293 However, these cases arguably did not apply misuse as
an affirmative defense to infringement; instead, they held that a license agreement’s restrictions beyond the patent’s scope were
290

Id. at 430. The Court also held that a patent does not make the patentee “a
quasi-trustee for the public” by obligating the patentee to particular uses, but rather the public policy purpose of patents is “to induce a disclosure of” the invention in exchange for the right to exclude others from using what was disclosed
until expiration of the patent term. Id. at 424.
291
Id. at 424, 429.
292
Id. at 430.
293
See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917) (finding
post-sale restriction upon purchasers of patented machine was invalid and therefore no suit could be brought in equity for violation of the terms of the restriction);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)
(finding license restriction void and therefore no infringement for uses that violated the restriction); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33–34
(1931) (finding no contributory infringement where defendant sold an unpatented
staple article, dry ice, with knowledge that it would be used in patented equipment); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (finding no contributory infringement based on sale of unpatented staple article for use in patented process, but noting that “every use of a patent as a means of obtaining a
limited monopoly of unpatented material is prohibited . . . .”).
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invalid or that the conduct did not amount to contributory patent infringement rather than holding a patent infringed yet still unenforceable.294 These, therefore, cannot accurately be said to define the
scope of the misuse doctrine as incorporated into the statutory text.
In Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., the Supreme Court
more clearly applied patent misuse as a defense to patent infringement.295 Morton Salt was a suit for direct patent infringement
brought in equity.296 The patentee of a machine for depositing salt
tablets into cans leased its machines to customers on the condition
that its lessees purchase unpatented salt tablets from the patentee.297
After a competitor began to sell an allegedly infringing machine, the
patentee brought suit against the competitor for direct infringement.298 The Supreme Court found that patentee’s conduct in tying
the lease of a patented machine to the sale of salt tablets was “contrary to public policy.”299 The Court noted that courts, especially in
equity, may deny relief “where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest.”300 Therefore, the Court determined301 that even if the defendant’s use was infringing, the Court
would not permit the patentee to obtain equitable relief for the infringement until “the improper practice has been abandoned.”302
294

See Straus, 243 U.S. at 501; Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 518; Carbice
Corp., 283 U.S. at 33–34; Leitch Mfg. Co., 302 U.S. at 463.
295
See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
296
See id. at 489–90 (seeking the equitable remedies of an injunction and accounting).
297
Id. at 490–91.
298
Id.
299
Id. at 494.
300
Id. at 492 (citation omitted) (noting that a court of equity may in its discretion withhold equitable relief in furtherance of the public interest, and providing
that “[i]n considering the propriety of the equitable relief granted here, we cannot
ignore the judgment of Congress . . . .”). To the extent that this statement was
meant to extend the doctrine of misuse beyond equity, it was dicta. See id. at 492–
93.
301
See also id. at 490 (“The question we must decide is . . . whether a court of
equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent is using it
as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented
article.”).
302
Id. at 493 (“Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of
the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at
least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned and
that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.”).
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Next, in B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. (“Mercoid I”), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (“Mercoid II”), the Court further
extended its punishment of tying arrangements as misuse, eventually spurring congressional intervention with the 1952 Patent Act.303
In B.B. Chemical, the Court found that a patentee that derived revenue for its patent by selling unpatented coated fabric especially
made for use in its patented shoe-reinforcing method could not enforce its patent in equity due to misuse.304 This extension reached a
fever pitch in 1944 with Mercoid I and II, which held that a patentee engaged in misuse and therefore had no remedy in equity because it calculated royalties owed for a patent on a furnace heating
system based on sales of a specialized switch essential to the system’s operation.305 The B.B. Chemical and the Mercoid I and II fact
patterns no longer constitute misuse after the 1952 Patent Act and
under section 271(d), which provides that it is not misuse to derive
revenue from what would be contributory infringement if performed
by another.306 Contributory infringement would include the sale of
a component of a patented invention or material for use in a patented
process (like coated fabric307 for a shoe-reinforcing process308 or a
303

See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213, 229, 236
(1980) (noting that one purpose for legislation of 1952 Patent Act was to overrule
the Mercoid I and II misuse rationale, which was previously supported in B.B.
Chemical).
304
B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 496–98 (1942) (holding that even
if accused infringer actively induced infringement, suit was properly dismissed
because patentee’s “use of the patent as the means of establishing a limited monopoly in its unpatented materials” was “contrary to public policy”).
305
See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661,
666–68 (1944) (“That result obtains here though we assume for the purposes of
this case that Mercoid was a contributory infringer and that respondents could
have enjoined the infringement had they not misused the patent for the purpose of
monopolizing unpatented material.”); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co. (Mercoid II), 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944) (first citing Morton, 314
U.S. at 494; and then citing B.B. Chem., 314 U.S. at 495) (“It likewise follows
that respondent may not obtain from a court of equity any decree which directly
or indirectly helps it to subvert the public policy which underlies the grant of its
patent.”).
306
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
307
B.B. Chem., 314 U.S. at, 496–98.
308
Id.
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specialized switch for a furnace309), with knowledge that the component or material is especially made or adapted for use in the patented invention, provided that it is not a staple article with a substantial non-infringing use.310 Indeed, the exceptions in section
271(d) were developed primarily to abrogate Mercoid I and II.311
3. DOES MISUSE EXTEND INTO ACTIONS AT LAW?
Prior to codification in 1952, the doctrine of patent misuse was
only used to bar equitable relief. Although one case, Carbice Corp.
v. American Patents Development Corp. in 1931, denied a claim in
equity that included a request for damages while using some of the
language of misuse, this case only reversed a finding of contributory
infringement rather than applying patent misuse to bar enforceability of a patent found to be infringed.312 Specifically, the court of appeals found that the sale of dry ice with the intent that it be used to
infringe a patent on refrigerated packaging constituted contributory
infringement, reversing the finding of the trial court.313 The trial
court opinion notes that the defenses raised were invalidity and

309

Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 666–68.
See id.
311
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 209–14 (1980)
(discussing legislative history of section 271(d) and noting “the legislative history
reveals that § 271(d) was designed to retreat from Mercoid . . . .”).
312
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 28, 31, 33–35
(1931) (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 515 (1917)) (“The limited monopoly to make, use, and vend an article may
not be ‘expanded by limitations as to materials and supplies necessary to the operation of it.’”). Although Carbice was mentioned in hearings on misuse reform
prior to the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, these hearings sought to balance the
doctrines of contributory infringement and misuse, so the hearings considered
both cases, and the distinction between a finding of no contributory infringement
and a finding of misuse was not material in that context, as it is here to the law
and equity distinction. A Bill to Prove for the Protection of Patent Rights Where
Enforcement Against Direct Infringement is Impracticable, to Define “Contributory Infringement,” and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 3866 Before the S.
Comm. No. 4 on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 67 (1949) (statement of Giles Rich)
(“The exception which we wish to make to the misuse doctrine would reverse the
result in the Mercoid case; it would not reverse the result in the Carbice case.”).
313
Am. Patents Dev. Corp. v. Carbice Corp., 38 F.2d 62, 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1930)
(rejecting argument made in reliance on Motion Picture “that [defendant] did not
infringe”), rev’d, 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
310
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noninfringement, with no mention of misuse.314 Given that misuse
was not raised below and that the decision that was reversed was for
a finding of contributory infringement, not a finding of no misuse,315
Carbice cannot be said to be a case defining the misuse defense. In
every other case discussed above, the Supreme Court only denied
equitable relief.316
In Morton Salt, the Court linked the misuse doctrine to one that
requires those seeking relief in equity to have “clean hands” and repeatedly referenced principles of equity and the unique considerations when granting equitable relief as the basis for its holding.317
Mercoid I, likewise, based its holding on the unique considerations
of equitable relief.318 Yet, misuse does not involve fraud in the formation of an instrument or fraud in obtaining a judgment at law, so
314

Am. Patents Dev. Corp. v. Carbice Corp., 25 F.2d 730, 731 (E.D.N.Y.
1928) (“Defendant offers the defenses of invalidity and noninfringement.”), rev’d,
38 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1930), rev’d, 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
315
Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 30, 33.
316
See B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942). In B.B. Chemical,
a case discussed above, the Court rejected the patentee’s final plea to avoid dismissal, which was to offer the infringer a royalty-based license, but this was offered to undermine the finding of misuse rather than as an alternative award of
relief from the court, and the case was solely brought in equity seeking equitable
relief. See id.
317
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492–94 (1942) (linking patent misuse to the equitable doctrine of “clean hands” and noting “[e]quity
may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent . . . .”); see also
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (“petitioners . . . raise as their only defense to liability the contention that respondent, by
engaging in patent misuse, comes into court with unclean hands”); id. at 193 (noting that Morton Salt “explicitly linked the doctrine of patent misuse to the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine traditionally applied by courts of equity”); C.R. Bard, Inc.
v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no misuse but
noting in dicta that “[t]he defense of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands . . . . Patent misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse
renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself,
invalidate the patent.”).
318
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661, 669
(1944) (citing Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)) (“It is sufficient to say that
in whatever posture the issue may be tendered courts of equity will withhold relief
where the patentee and those claiming under him are using the patent privilege
contrary to the public interest.”). Id. at 665 (“The Court has repeatedly held that
to allow such suits would be to extend the aid of a court of equity in expanding
the patent beyond the legitimate scope of its monopoly.”).
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it would not fall within the narrow category of unclean hands defenses that acted to bar legal relief such as damages prior to codification.319
After 1952, no Supreme Court case has upheld a finding of misuse.320 In light of the pre-1952 caselaw, a court applying a traditional
approach would likely not use patent misuse to bar a claim for damages at law, even if only temporarily while the conduct persists. The
traditional approach would likewise caution that misuse should not
be read as an “all-purpose claim against patent enforcement,” but
should instead be limited to the scope of the doctrine as it was applied prior to 1952, with modifications to comply with the additional
statutory exceptions in section 271(d).321 A dynamic approach, in
contrast, would allow courts to extend misuse beyond its pre-codification roots to bar all remedies, including damages at law where
the court deems it appropriate.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Dynamic vs. Traditional Approaches: Constitutional
Authority
Some scholars urge courts to institute a complete merger of law
and equity whereby all equitable defenses are available to bar all
legal claims, arguing that barriers should not be maintained merely
because we are blindly following a “historical accident.”322 Those
319

Supra Part II.B.
See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43, 46 (2006)
(vacating and remanding for a determination of whether the patentee’s conduct
was anticompetitive); Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 223 (finding no misuse).
321
Burk, supra note 275, at 1117 n.126 (noting that, in recent years, misuse
has often been invoked “as a low-cost substitute for antitrust analysis” and came
to be viewed “as a bargain-basement, all-purpose claim against patent enforcement”).
322
T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justification
of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 478, 509 (2008); see Douglas Laycock,
The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53–54 (1993) (“The war
between law and equity is over. Equity won. . . . Except where references to equity have been codified, as in the constitutional guarantees of jury trial, we should
consider it wholly irrelevant whether a remedy, procedure, or doctrine originated
at law or in equity.”); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., Foreword to SELECTED ESSAYS
320
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using a traditional approach might hold that these arguments lack
sway in the context of statutory equitable defenses like in patent law,
where it was Congress, not “historical accident,” that determined
how those doctrines should apply.323 Moreover, Congress made a
choice to codify and stabilize the doctrines as they existed at a particular point in time.324
Under the traditional approach to equitable defenses, courts applying equity in patent law would look to history at the time of enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 to determine the availability of
equitable defenses to legal claims.325 Courts should begin by determining whether the equitable doctrine at issue is imputed into the
text of a statutory provision by reference, such as the unenforceability defense available under section 282 of the Patent Act. If so,
courts should examine the scope of decisional law to determine
whether expansion of the doctrine would go beyond what was understood under the language of the statute at the time of enactment.
If an application of an equitable doctrine does not either arise under
the statute as it was understood at the time of enactment or arise
from established decisional law at the time of enactment, courts
should be mindful to avoid extending the doctrine in a way that
would exceed its statutory and historical roots.
Under a traditional approach, courts should respect Congress’s
choice to use a common term with a defined meaning, in part because they lack the constitutional authority to further expand

ON EQUITY iii–iv (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (It would be “absurd for us to go on
until the year 2000 obliging judges and lawyers to climb over a barrier which was
put up by historical accident in 14th century England . . . .”).
323
Laycock, supra note 322, at 53–54 (noting exceptions to the argument in
favor of substantive merger “where references to equity have been codified, as in
the constitutional guarantees of jury trial . . . .”).
324
See Federico, supra note 27, at 166 (noting the goal of the 1952 Patent Act
to codify, stabilize, and modify decisional law doctrines); Dawson Chem. Co.,
448 U.S. at 180 (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial rules
that had governed prior to that time.”).
325
See Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 180 (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the
patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts
for the general judicial rules that had governed prior to that time.”).
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statutory law.326 According to a traditional argument, the Constitution vested the power to make law “in a Congress,” not the courts.327
This is particularly true in patent law, where the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .”328 The power to determine the policy goals of patents lies with Congress.329 By cabining equitable doctrines to the
scope as they existed when the patent statutes incorporated them,
courts abide by the policy balance struck by Congress and avoid
readings that run contrary to the statutory rights of patentees to
“have remedy by civil action for infringement of [their] patent[s].”330 Moreover, incorporating the version of the law as it was
understood at the time of enactment, rather than allowing courts to
develop law beyond the scope of what was enacted, complies with
constitutional principles of separation of powers and nondelegation.331 The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”332
and the Supreme Court has “long . . . insisted that ‘the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative

326

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.”).
327
Id.
328
U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
329
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“Policy arguments
are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.”); see also Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 523, 526 (1987) (“Deciding what competing values will
or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very
essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative
intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”).
330
35 U.S.C. § 281.
331
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
371–72 (1989) (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
332
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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power to another Branch.”333 In the event of changed circumstances
justifying a change in the law, those who accept the more historical
approach would argue that it is the role of Congress, not that of the
courts, to amend the law.334
In contrast, those adopting a more dynamic approach, one that
permits development of the law after codification, would argue that
the broad term “unenforceability” leaves significant gaps for courts
to fill in the contours of the doctrine and adapt it over time. By using
broad language, Congress could have anticipated that courts would
further hone the body of common law as courts had done in the years
prior. Moreover, the flexible approach allows equitable defenses to
retain their equitable nature, which might have been intended by
Congress when it referred to the doctrine of unenforceability. Under
a dynamic approach, one might also raise concern that an approach
to statutory interpretation that depends upon the meaning at enactment is unrealistic because Congress cannot possibly foresee all future circumstances where policy might justify an expansion of current law.
B.
Policy Considerations
Many scholars argue that patent law “is a common law enabling
statute”335 that gives power to courts to set various “policy levers”
of patent law.336 The policy justifications given in the scholarship
for a dynamic approach include the following: Courts are better
suited than Congress to determine the policy needs of patents because they have closer knowledge of the impact of those decisions
on litigants.337 The sometimes irreconcilable differences between
competing interests in patent law, such as between technology and
pharmaceutical industry groups, can make attempts at reform in a
333

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (1892)).
See id.
335
Nard, supra note 8, at 53; see Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 801.
336
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1668 (2003).
337
Nard, supra note 8, at 55–56 (“[T]he patent system is best served when the
reform-minded engage patent law’s traditional policy driver – the judiciary . . . .The judge, in the Hayekian sense, is closer to the ‘inside baseball’ dynamic that is unique to each of the divergent industries that participate in the patent system . . . .[T]he common law is more likely to develop doctrine that reflects
an industry’s legitimate expectations.”).
334
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body that requires consensus, such as Congress, nearly impossible.338 The level of nuance and adaptability required for patent policy to be optimally balanced can be achieved within a more reasonable timeframe and at a lower cost by courts than by specific rules
set out by Congress.339 Moreover, Congress lacks the staff hours to
fully assess the policy impact of legislation on complex issues like
patent law, particularly in any kind of agile manner capable of responding to the latest technological changes and legal and societal
norms.340
In contrast, those supporting a traditional approach341 would
raise competing arguments for Congress’s institutional advantage
on matters of policy. First, courts can make uninformed policy decisions because they lack the resources that are uniquely available
to lawmakers for determining policy.342 Although Congress may
hear commentary from diverse stakeholders as to how the laws will
affect them, call hearings to ask stakeholders questions, negotiate
consensus between industries, and commission social science or
economics studies and await their results before acting,343 a judge
often has far less information available and must act timely on the
case before her regardless of whether she has a full picture of the
policy implications. Although gridlock can slow the pace of legislation and result in law that is unable to adapt to changing circumstances, the benefit of consolidation of many competing interests is
lost when a court chooses the law to suit the equities of only the
parties in a dispute. A judge might, in the worst case, substitute her
own reasoning for careful policy decisions on issues covered by statute.

338

See Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 801 (“[R]ecent attempts at reform show
that rent seeking by particular technological interests thwarts the adoption of
sound rules.”).
339
Burk & Lemley, supra note 336, at 1668.
340
See Anna Hensel, Congress Lacks Tech Knowledge to Properly Question
Google CEO Sundbar Pichai, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 11, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/12/11/congress-lacks-tech-knowledge-to-properly-questiongoogle-ceo-sundar-pichai/.
341
See Manning, supra note 7, at 5.
342
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 336, at 1669.
343
See The Legislative Branch, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
about-the-white-house/the-legislative-branch/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
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Particularly in patent law, where appellate jurisdiction is placed
exclusively before a single federal circuit, the opportunities to gather
information on policy making and consider the impact of alternative
decisions is limited.344 Without other circuit courts to develop and
test alternative approaches to the law, the federal circuit lacks sufficient information to gauge the potential impact of different legal
choices.345 Moreover, where the law develops in a lone federal circuit, rules set forth in prior cases often calcify to the point that the
federal circuit is unlikely to change them without Supreme Court
intervention—an environment that is not well-suited to agile policymaking.346 In contrast, leaving policy decisions to Congress ensures
that voters have accountable representation of their policy interests
and limits politicization of the judiciary.347
Second, modern courts are typically (and appropriately) unwilling to make affirmative policy decisions.348 Courts’ unwillingness
to engage in affirmative policy making may result in unintentional
policy if, for example, the needs of a case require gap-filling on the
scope of a law that ultimately implicates policy concerns. Moreover,
unintentional policy is often incorrect policy because it lacks the
considerations of how rules impact the rights of those outside the
case at hand.349 Modern courts base decisions chiefly on precedent
and interpretation of law, appropriately limiting their decisions to
the case at hand as much as possible, rather than basing decisions on
a thorough consideration of the policy interests of stakeholders
344
See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1632 (2007) (arguing that single
Federal Circuit limits generation of ideas for legal decision-making around patent
law).
345
See id.
346
See id. at 1644.
347
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at xxiii, xxvii.
348
See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (“[W]e cannot overrule Congress’s judgment based on
our own policy views.”). In the last few decades, courts have returned to a textualist approach to statutory interpretation. See Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel,
supra note 84, at 1137–38 (discussing modern trends toward textualism and its
impact on statutory interpretation of patent law). This trend will likely continue
further given the makeup of the Court as of 2020.
349
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 336, at 1669 (arguing that courts tend to
get patent policy decisions wrong when they “wash their hands of involvement in
the calibration of policy”).
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outside the litigation and eye toward consensus building between
those interests.350 Patent law in particular is not one of those areas
of law where the Supreme Court typically engages in standard-setting based on policy—indeed, the Supreme Court often takes a textualist approach to patent law.351 Particularly, as to the scope of equitable defenses to patents, which have immense power in a lawsuit
to wipe out the entirety of a judgment if applied at law, those supporting a traditional approach would argue that the policy decisions
of patent law require a deliberate, affirmative stance that courts are
often unable and appropriately unwilling to provide.352
Third, those arguing in favor of a traditional approach would
urge that the slow pace and requirement for consensus and codification of the law into text promotes certainty and predictability in the
law. A single court decision can change in an instant what patent
stakeholders believe to be the law, rendering issued patents subject
to invalidation and in some cases, undermining the viability of entire
industries that relied upon the prior legal regime.353 Although legislation can also have this effect, it does so at a slower pace that enables key stakeholders to engage with policy makers and allows legislators to attempt to build consensus between competing industries’
interests, often with review and comment upon drafts of bills as they
will be passed.354 In contrast, litigants often do not know and cannot
predict exactly what standards courts will adopt to apply the law in
particular cases when a novel issue arises—until the opinion issues,
the precise articulation of the standard will be unknown to the public. Moreover, because court decisions can change through review
by higher courts or by modification of a doctrine in the next case in
response to different facts, standards set forth by courts are less stable than laws passed by Congress. Certainty is important to patent
law in particular because if patentees and those who practice inventions cannot determine with reasonable certainty whether and what
350
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 4–5 (1999) (advocating for “judicial minimalism” whereby

courts limit the scope of their decision to the case at hand).
351
See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018).
352
See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 967.
353
See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 939, 939 (2017).
354
See The Legislative Branch, supra note 343.
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remedies will be available for infringement of patents, it changes
assessments of the values and risks of investing in patenting and
product development.355 The more certainty that courts and lawmakers can provide to innovators as to whether and what type of relief a
patentee can obtain for infringement, what behaviors will be deemed
inequitable, and what effect those behaviors will have on the right
to recovery, the more investments in innovation will be respected
today and incentivized tomorrow. Parties can still mitigate risk of
uncertainty under a dynamic interpretive regime, but it requires, at
a minimum, that courts are predictable about which method they
will use and the principles that govern its application.
C.
Alternative Actions by Congress
There is an alternative way for Congress to address the concern
that a static approach to statutory interpretation fails to account for
changing circumstances: If tailored to limit conflict with the nondelegation doctrine, Congress could provide, by the text of a statute,
that the courts or an administrative agency may continue to develop
defenses or standards for applying a doctrine within the contours
laid out in the statute.356 The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may delegate determinations of details of a law provided that Congress sets forth the contours and policy guidelines and identifies
which body will develop those details.357
In practice, Congress frequently delegates some authority to
agencies when the details of a law might need to change with
355

See supra Part III.B.
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2139 (2005) (arguing that statutes can be tailored by
their text to be decided according to different interpretive principles). Under the
nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate lawmaking authority to another branch without “‘lay[ing] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” Whitman
v. American Trucking Ass’n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). This flows from the
Constitution placing “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . in a Congress of the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
357
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (“[T]his Court has
deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
authority.’”). One might question whether this is consistent with the nondelegation doctrine. See id.
356
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changed circumstances, including in intellectual property statutes.358 For example, in the section of the copyright statute that provides that it is unlawful to attempt to circumvent a technological
measure that is designed to prevent copyright infringement, Congress delegated the ability to set forth, every three years, particular
exceptions to this rule to account for changes in technology and societal needs.359 Congress could delegate authority to an agency to
address the impact of changing technologies on the proper scope of
defenses, provided that the delegation includes sufficient guidance
to limit conflicts with the nondelegation doctrine.360 For example,
the Federal Trade Commission could be tasked with setting forth
what uses of a patent would be deemed contrary to the public interest
under a misuse analysis, akin to what the Copyright Office sets forth
with regard to exceptions to anti-circumvention rules.361 Alternatively, Congress could provide that the Patent Office set forth standards for what constitutes fraud in obtaining a patent.362
Congress can use words that give broader or narrower authority
to courts to determine the reach of the law.363 For example, the Sherman Act provides that conduct “in restraint of trade” is illegal, without defining this term.364 Many urge that this statute delegated authority to courts to determine which conduct leads to a particular
economic consequence, which might differ over time365—others
might say this authority is inconsistent with nondelegation.366 In patent law’s equitable defenses, those arguing for a dynamic approach
might say that Congress’s broad general language was a delegation
358

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (enabling the Librarian of Congress to set
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to courts to continue to develop the law.367 In contrast, those arguing
for an imputed common law approach would say that when Congress used the term “unenforceability,” with an established history
in decisional law, it limited the power of courts to act contrary to
those boundaries.368 Nevertheless, even words that carry boundaries
imputed from common law do not block the inherent power of
courts to apply the law by assessing whether a new situation falls
within prior boundaries. Ultimately, the reach of equitable defenses
comes down to a statutory interpretive choice and Congress has not
instructed courts on which method they should apply in patent law.
CONCLUSION
Equity in patent litigation is a high-stakes game, where equitable
defenses such as unclean hands and misuse have the capacity to render multi-million-dollar patent infringement verdicts unenforceable
if these defenses are interpreted to bar remedies at law. Although
equity is often thought to be a flexible doctrine that courts have discretion to extend,369 when equitable doctrines are codified into a
statute, significant interpretive questions arise as to whether and
how courts’ application of equity is constrained by imputed law. Under a faithful agent approach, equitable defenses would not be extended beyond the boundaries existing in the common law at enactment. Under a dynamic approach, courts would share the duty to
update and expand the law of equitable defenses, and perhaps even
their reach into actions at law, in accordance with the social and legal norms in place at the time a case is decided. The facts and procedural history of one case might align with a historical nuance in
one instance, even when history or policy, depending on the approach used, would not support extension of the same rule in another. Until the Supreme Court provides guidance, lower courts will
need to consider not only the equities of a particular case but also
historical, normative, and constitutional considerations to decide on
an appropriate interpretive method and outcome. This Article provides the battle map to guide such considerations.
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